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ABSTRACT 
 
The goal of this project, conducted for El Cuerpo de Bomberos, the 
national fire department of Costa Rica, was to promote understanding and 
responsibility for the effects that chemical disasters have on the environment.  
We created TEEICI, Tool for Evaluating the Environmental Impact of Chemical 
Incidents, to quantify the environmental damage done by hazardous materials.  
The program is to be used for communicating to the Environmental Tribunal of 
Costa Rica the extent of the environmental impact caused by polluters.  During 
our studies of many chemical disasters, we also formulated recommendations 
that would reduce the frequency of chemical incidents and better improve 
emergency response.  
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Each year, over two hundred incidents involving hazardous chemicals 
occur in Costa Rica but their effects on the environment are unknown.  In order 
to study the damage caused by these events, we have created an easy-to-use 
evaluation package: Tool for Evaluating Environmental Impact of Chemical 
Incidents (TEEICI).  El Cuerpo de Bomberos, the national fire department, will 
use this system to communicate the severity of each incident to the judicial 
system.  Additionally, to explore the associated consequences to humans, we 
have created a subcomponent of TEEICI: Human and Economic Ramification 
Tool (HERT).  With the aid of these tools, we expect to raise awareness of the 
level of damage being done by dangerous substances to the environment. 
The Bomberos, a division of the Instituto Nacional de Seguros1 (INS), 
safeguards four million Costa Ricans from a wide range of manmade and natural 
disasters.  These events include gasoline spills, ammonia leaks, chemical 
explosions, as well as a variety of other accidents.  At times, industries recklessly 
pollute the environment because they are not charged with the remediation.  
Consequently, the Costa Rican people and the environment must pay the penalty 
instead.  The Bomberos recognize that by knowing more about the impacts these 
accidents have on the environment, they will not only be able to better prevent 
future accidents and clean up contaminated sites more efficiently, but also to 
force polluters to take responsibility for the devastating effects they are imposing 
on the country. 
With over a three percent annual expansion of industries in Costa Rica, 
these industries are beginning to resemble those found in more developed 
                                                 
1 National Institute of Securities 
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nations, leading to an increase in the amounts of hazardous materials present in 
the country.  Unfortunately, as companies have expanded their production to this 
nation, laws, regulations, enforcement, and knowledge regarding the growing 
level of hazardous materials have not kept pace with the dangers involved. 
The Bomberos are initially in charge of all chemical incident sites and 
therefore deemed authorities on the subject of past accidents.  Due to their 
extensive involvement, the Environmental Tribunal, held by MINAE2, often 
summons the Bomberos to testify following an accident.  However, there is 
currently no system in place that determines the risk posed to the environment by 
chemical accidents.  As a result, cases are often dismissed due to inconclusive 
findings. 
Having a practical and unambiguous scale that evaluates the 
environmental impact caused by chemical accidents is undoubtedly 
advantageous to Costa Rica on a national scale.  Owing to an explicit numerical 
scale, aspects such as damage to an area of soil, water systems, air quality, or 
wildlife can be expressed to a wide audience with ease, regardless of its 
background.  For the Bomberos, this means that they can effectively provide 
higher authorities with a detailed description of consequences.  Interested parties 
include the MINAE, Ministerio de Salud3, Comisión Nacional de Emergencias4, 
as well as the administrative authorities of INS.  TEEICI will be valuable for the 
Bomberos to use when testifying in court and will assist in holding responsible 
parties accountable for endangering the people and habitats of the country. 
 One of the most significant aspects of our project is that once the 
evaluation system is in place to make on-site environmental assessments, these 
                                                 
2 Ministry of Environment and Energy 
3 Ministry of Health 
4 National Commission on Emergencies 
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reports can be used for any purposes well beyond those involving legal action.  
TEEICI and HERT allow the Bomberos and other emergency personnel to 
catalogue all of the consequences of hazardous accidents as they happen.  
Once the results are compiled, any interested parties in Costa Rica will be able to 
contact the Bomberos and obtain a listing of all of the damage done categorized 
by type of accident, type of pollution, or impact.  The possibilities for analysis and 
application of this data are then only limited by the creativity and needs of those 
concerned.  Once analyzed, this data can be used in education and research, 
most importantly in medical, preventative, and environmental studies.  For 
example, one could study the trends between causes and severity of accidents, 
and thus identify areas of concern and formulate remedies.  It is therefore of 
great importance that TEEICI is able to record the raw data in an easy-to-
understand and accessible format that anyone can use. 
 In addition to creating an environmental assessment model, we have 
developed HERT to quantify fiscal damage, which will institute a greater sense of 
responsibility to companies and industries that use chemicals on a daily basis.  
For example, the cost of cleaning up the contaminated soil and water could be 
appraised and the responsible company would be obligated to pay for 
decontamination.  Furthermore, when people and livestock are killed or injured, 
those accountable could be obligated to compensate the victims and their 
families. 
 To create TEEICI and its subcomponent HERT, we personally visited 
several accident sites in order to study the damage done by various chemicals in 
different volumes.  We conducted research on chemical accident sites that varied 
from the chemical released to the geographic characteristics of the surrounding 
areas.  At each site, we interviewed as many emergency responders and victims 
 xiii
of the incident as possible, in addition to noting any lasting effects on vegetation 
and animal life.   
 Once we had a basis for our own evaluation system, we interviewed many 
experts to obtain their opinions on the viability and validity of the model.  The 
experts that we interviewed came from an array of institutions, including 
universities, industries, and governmental organizations.  In order for 
assessments based on our model to withstand court proceedings including 
cross-examination, which would be its primary purpose, we needed to make sure 
that the model was accurate.  Although we incorporated as many expert opinions 
as possible, the system still requires further testing. 
 TEEICI also has the capability to correlate the level of damage done to the 
rate at which nature will recover.  The eight weeks we spent making and testing 
this model did not offer enough time to analyze soil and water samples from 
accident sites.  Given this limitation, we could not verify if the model was 
accurate predicting the length of time for full recovery in soil, water, air, and plant 
life.  A future project could determine TEEICI’s level of accuracy, as well as make 
calibrations to increase precision. 
 The nature of our research lent itself to gathering information from multiple 
governmental organizations.  Unfortunately, Costa Rica’s ministries often lack 
communication, primarily because there is neither a coordinated data collection 
effort, nor a central system in place to disseminate information effectively.  In the 
future, these problems could be remedied by establishing data collection 
coordination and then optimizing communication.  It would also be beneficial to 
create a centralized database that stores TEEICI data, along with all other data 
collected by individual ministries at accident sites, undoubtedly simplifying the 
process of analyzing chemical accidents. 
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There are few places left in the world where humans have not fouled their 
own nest.  Because of the ecological consciousness of Costa Rica, thirty percent 
of the country remains as protected natural reserves, which are home to 
hundreds of rare species, some of which are in danger of extinction or cannot be 
found anywhere else in the world.  With the help of TEEICI, the Bomberos can 
illustrate to the rest of the country what the impact of industrialization continues 
to be on the environment.  When the level of this damage becomes clear, 
polluters will be forced to take responsibility for the destruction of Costa Rica’s 
natural habitats.  Consequently, there will be a reduction in the number of 
accidents that occur, ensuring the wellbeing of Costa Rica’s habitats for years to 
come. 
The people of Costa Rica will benefit immensely from a reduction in 
chemical accidents.  Death, injury, and sickness caused by chemicals will be 
reduced greatly, and it will be safer to live near highways or chemical plants.  
This will also help farmers protect their crops and livestock, which are vital to the 
health of the population, from the devastating effects of chemical spills.  In 
addition to the aforementioned benefits, Costa Rica profits financially by 
maintaining a healthy environment, since sixty percent of the economy depends 
on ecotourism.  It would be difficult to find anyone in Costa Rica who would not 
be benefited by a thorough study of the chemical effects on the environment. 
We are confident that TEEICI will serve the Bomberos and other branches of the 
Costa Rican government as the basis for evaluating the impact of chemical 
incidents in forthcoming years.  Within the recommendations we have made, 
there lies great potential for improvement.  This can be realized with WPI’s 
continuing cooperation with the Costa Rican government for the development of 
the nation. 
 xv
Chapter I: INTRODUCTION 
 
 Most of the industries that people in modern society depend on utilize a 
variety of chemicals that must be stored and transported around the world.  
There is an inherent health and environmental risk in using, shipping, and storing 
these materials.  Many of them are dangerous to people and other organisms, 
especially when concentrated in one area.  Events such as accidental spills and 
disregard for handling regulations (U. S. Department of Transportation, 2005) 
result in degradation of the environment and consequences to its inhabitants.  
Despite the amount of care exercised in safeguarding these materials, past 
events have shown that accidents are inevitable.   
On November 3, 2004 at a chemical plant in Cartago, Costa Rica, the 
valve for a massive storage tank containing 40,000 liters of super gasoline 
malfunctioned even though all due care was taken in the handling process.  As a 
result, the chemical plant was evacuated, and a nearby coffee plantation was 
filled with gasoline, destroying the crops (see Appendix Q).  Considering the 
consequences of that accident, similar incidents must be dealt with in an 
appropriate and rapid manner, and it is therefore necessary that emergency 
personnel be adequately prepared to respond to such catastrophes. 
In an ideal situation, all chemicals would be produced and transported 
safely and none would leak into the environment and cause damage.  This is 
usually the case, and a majority of chemicals reach their destination without 
incident (Spitz, 2003).  Unfortunately, no method devised to store chemicals is 
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flawless.  Equipment will sometimes fail and individuals responsible for chemicals 
do not always do their jobs properly, making a contingency plan necessary to 
handle situations deviating from ideality.  
A precise and prompt response would ensure a reduction in the immediate 
damage and would lead to a better long-term outcome.  In an attempt to ensure 
minimal incident rates, standard operations call for constant monitoring and 
maintenance of everything from storage units and chemical production plants, to 
pipelines and transportation vehicles. 
 Successful day-to-day operations are not reported on the news because 
they are typical and uninteresting.  However, when these basic procedures are 
not followed, disasters occur, becoming newsworthy events.  For instance, on 
June 13, 2002, a five hundred-pound tank leaked chlorine gas into the 
environment at an industrial plant in Cartago, Costa Rica (see Appendix Q). 
Due to the gaseous nature of chlorine at these conditions, the firefighters 
could only wait for the chlorine to dissipate into the air.  Even though the 
firefighters were successful in closing the valve in a timely manner, over a 
thousand people had respiratory problems and had to be hospitalized in 
neighboring areas, as far as San Pedro and Guadalupe.  This was because the 
wind had shifted the cloud of gas in the direction of the settlements, and there 
was no way to contain it.  A chlorine leak such as this is potentially dangerous to 
human life, as well as detrimental to any ecosystems with which it may come in 
contact.   
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When an accident such as this occurs, authorities such as the Ministerio 
de Salud, as well as the Environmental Tribunal held by MINAE are very 
interested in learning the extent of the environmental impact.  The Environmental 
Tribunal is responsible for prosecuting those damaging the natural environment 
of Costa Rica.  On average, two hundred chemical accidents occur annually in 
Costa Rica (Appendix Q), yet there was no system in place to determine the 
damage to the environment.  Most accidents are never completely cleaned up, 
and chemicals are left to be absorbed into the soil and water, which in turn 
harshly affect plant, animal, and human life.  The Bomberos are very concerned 
about this lack of information and thus needed an efficient method to evaluate 
the damage caused to the environment, and clearly communicate the extent of 
damage to higher authorities. 
Our primary goal was to promote understanding and responsibility for the 
impact of chemical incidents on the natural environment for the Bomberos, as 
well as the general population of Costa Rica.  This was accomplished by our 
objective to create an easy-to-use on-site evaluation system, TEEICI, for use by 
the Bomberos immediately after an accident has occurred.  This system is 
comprised of a numerical scale that individually takes into account the damage to 
soil, water, air, flora, fauna, and human life.  At an accident site, once the 
necessary information has been determined, Bomberos can fill out the evaluation 
system, and an overall numerical impact level can be assigned to the incident as 
a whole.  By using quantitative descriptors, this information can be 
communicated easily to any interested parties, as shown in Appendix C and E. 
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To accomplish our primary goal, we investigated past chemical accident 
sites around the country where we calibrated a working scale to accurately reflect 
the environmental damage.  We based our collection techniques on advice given 
to us from Ana Lorena Arías of Surá Soluciones Ambiental, an environmental 
engineer and expert in environmental assessments (Appendix G).  With the 
necessary information collected, we fine-tuned our evaluation system to be as 
accurate as possible.  After having created this tool, we evaluated its validity 
against real-life situations.   
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Chapter II: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.0 Reader’s Guide to the Literature Review 
 
This chapter provides background information specific to our project 
resulting from research our group conducted.  Its purpose is to introduce vital 
information regarding chemical spills and their environmental effects.  This 
chapter begins by characterizing various hazardous materials and continues to 
describe the damage caused by their release onto the environment. 
 
2.1 Chemical Damage 
 
April 11, 2003, played a pivotal role in making Costa Rica aware of the 
dangers accompanying chemicals, when one of the nation’s worst chemical 
disasters occurred.  An 
enormous paint factory 
erupted into flames, as can be 
seen in figure one.  The fire 
was caused by static 
electricity underneath an 
elevator shaft igniting nearby 
paint.  Many people were 
Figure 1: Explosion at Pinturasur Factory 
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injured in this accident but an unforeseen danger spread far away from the initial 
accident site (Appendix Q). 
Nearby to the paint factory flows the Río Torres (Torres River) that many 
of the poorer communities in San José without running water primarily use.  
Those without radios or televisions were caught off guard of the impending 
disaster, and many people drank the water, unaware of its dangers.  Along with 
the many people affected by this disaster, hundreds of fish died as a result, 
further illustrating the extensive environmental damage.  
 Visible signs of paint in the river did not clear for weeks.  Despite the best 
efforts of the Bomberos and other emergency personnel doing all they could to 
contain the spill with dikes, the paint from the enormous factory relentlessly 
continued seeping into the nearby drainage system.  Days later, when the last of 
the paint ceased trickling into the nearby river, the water was still not fit for 
drinking.  Some residents developed illnesses with symptoms such as nausea.   
 Over two years have passed since the accident and paint still covers the 
rocks all around the river.  Nature will slowly clean the water and rocks as time 
proceeds, but the long-term effects are severe.  Although the river is now filled 
with fish and residents are drinking the water once again, the scars left by the 
accident will take a very long time to heal.  This is typical of chemical accidents; 
the damage caused does not heal for years after the incident.   
 In this particular case, those at fault for the accident were never held 
accountable.  To prove that paint did contaminate the river, the Bomberos took 
water samples downstream of the spill.  The results were not surprising, showing 
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high levels of paint contamination.  When the case reached the environmental 
tribunal, the owners faced many fines and penalties for the environmental effects 
that the spill had.  To the surprise of the Bomberos, the owners argued that the 
river was contaminated prior to the accident.  The Bomberos had not taken 
samples upstream of the accident to serve as a control sample, and the case 
was closed without any parties held accountable. 
 
2.2 Studying Chemicals 
 
The environment provides a habitat that allows living organisms to 
flourish.  In the natural world, changes often occur slowly enough to allow 
species to adapt and survive.  For millions of years, nature has maintained a 
balance in which plant and animal populations can be sustained.  Since 
industrialization, the rate that humanity has been disturbing this state of 
equilibrium has increased alarmingly, and chemicals have played an enormous 
role in nature’s degradation.   
  For our purposes the term chemical will be defined as, “human-made or 
synthetic compounds—or not of natural origin,” (Merriam-Webster, 2004).  With 
the rise of chemical production, huge arrays of processes and industries have 
been allowed to develop and flourish.  Chemical production is needed for just 
about every industry, such as in fuels, plastics, clothing, or sanitization.  
However, chemicals pose a unique risk to the natural world because of the 
irreversible effect that they have on ecosystems.  Compared to the damage done 
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by natural disasters such as floods or earthquakes from which the earth adjusts 
relatively quickly, chemical damage can last for centuries or even be permanent 
(Moore, 1997). 
Whether contamination will remain at a chemical accident site for long 
periods of time depends on many factors.  Every type of hazardous substance 
behaves differently and consequently is important to use a variety of analytic 
methods in order to paint a complete picture of an accident.  Some chemicals will 
stay in the soil for long periods, but often sink deeper into the soil as time goes 
on.  Others will be evident only in biological pathways, such as discolored 
vegetation or contaminated fish.  Still others will be washed away by the rain in a 
relatively short amount of time and may leave no long-term indicators for study.  
Therefore, depending on how much time has passed since the accident, 
respective tests can be carried out.  For instance, one may generally not find 
testing water from rivers beneficial after two years unless the chemical was harsh 
enough to leave its remnants.  
In a contaminated river, it is important to study the condition upstream 
from the spill area and contrast it with the conditions further downstream.  
Perhaps the water will be very discolored and murky where contamination has 
taken place and relatively clear elsewhere.  The moss growing on the rocks will 
also indicate the presence of contaminants by its color – green if clean, brown or 
black if poisoned.  Plants growing along the river can also be a valuable signal, 
as contaminated areas will have less or unhealthy vegetation.  This is a condition 
visible by discoloration, yellow or brown instead of green or perhaps minimal or 
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stunted growth in the area of contamination.  Nevertheless, sampling may not 
provide sufficient information about the accident (see Appendices G and H). 
Damage to animal populations is hard to determine.  A large presence of 
small red worms in the soil is one perceptible indicator suggesting contamination.  
Apart from this, it is very difficult to count wild animals that may be affected as 
they often flee the area, and are difficult to keep track of given their natural 
tendency to stay hidden.   
 
 
2.3 Costa Rica’s Chemicals 
 
The economy in Costa Rica, like many countries, relies on chemical 
production.  Traditionally, most of the production in Costa Rica has been focused 
on produce due to its favorable climatic conditions.  By the 1980s, most of the 
production in Costa Rica was based on coffee and bananas (Fodor, 2005).  
However, the 1990s brought many new businesses to Costa Rica, including Dell, 
Motorola, and Intel.  By 1994, nineteen percent of production was chemicals, 
rubber, and plastics, fifty to seventy-five percent of which was exported (Lara, 
1995).  Having access to two oceans makes this country economically attractive, 
and therefore appealing to relocate to Costa Rica.  By 2003, Intel alone 
represented thirty-seven percent of exports (Fodor, 2005).  This is representative 
of Costa Rica’s industrial growth and prospective future as a fertile land for 
multinational investors. 
 9
 Despite Costa Rica’s small size, it is the site of twelve chemical production 
companies (http://www.1costaricalink.com, 2004).  Chemicals that are used in 
food products, such as acetic acid, citric acid, and ascorbic soda, are produced 
by El Grupo Transmerquim (http://www.transmerquim.com), a conglomerate of 
industries in Latin America.  Other chemicals are used in agriculture, such as 
potassium nitrate.  In 1999 alone, the manufacturing output of chemical products 
in Costa Rica netted $168 million, while the industrial chemicals sector netted 
$136 million, of which up to twenty-six percent was exported 
(http://www.costarica.com).  The Bomberos have suggested further investigation 
into the environmental impacts of chlorine, ammonia, and LPG due to the 
frequency of accidents involving these chemicals.  Due to extensive applications 
of these chemicals, there is a realistic probability that mishaps involving these 
particular substances may occur.  
 As vital as these substances are to maintaining human society, they can 
also be extremely hazardous to human life and to the environment as a whole.  
Chlorine gas, although used in sanitation, is deadly in large concentrations.  This 
chemical was used as a weapon in WW I because a breath of air containing one 
thousand ppm5 can be lethal to humans (Burke, Robert. 2003).  Chlorine is two 
and a half times heavier than air, and therefore stays close to the ground, further 
reducing chances of survival (US Department of Transport, 2004).  Chorine gas 
has myriad applications in pharmaceuticals, agrochemicals, solvents, and 
polymer production, to name a few.  Given the wide range of uses, chemicals are 
                                                 
5 parts per million 
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transported in large quantities around the world.  There are other commonly used 
chemicals that are worrisome for the environment besides chlorine, such as 
ammonia and LPG.  
Ammonia can be poisonous to living organisms, especially aquatic life that 
absorb it directly through the water that they live in (Vosjoli, 1992).  Due to the 
highly combustible characteristics of LPG and other fuels, there is a high risk of 
explosion in storage and transportation.  Mishaps involving flammable chemicals 
can result in a massive loss of life.  As seen in the previously mentioned example 
of chlorine gas escape, environmental damage is extremely severe and may last 
for indefinite periods. 
The transportation of commonly used hazardous chemicals is vital to the 
economy and industry.  Given its wide presence in the transportation stream, and 
the safety and security issues surrounding these activities, it is necessary that 
transportation laws and regulations be mandated in order to protect the public, 
facilitate compliance, and provide for the efficient movement of these essential 
materials. 
Unfortunately, traffic laws are not strictly enforced in Costa Rica, which 
often lead to disregard of transportation safety and subsequently, accidents.  
Most imported material is transported in tankers from the ports to the major cities.  
Given Costa Rica’s mountainous topography, the routes taken by these trucks 
are often narrow, winding, and steep—conditions which tend to increase the risk 
of accidents.  In addition to this, truck drivers often drive at high speeds in order 
to boost productivity.  Although all tankers are required by law to be clearly 
 11
placarded, many do not declare their contents.  This is dangerous because in 
case of an accident, the Bomberos would not know what kind of chemical they 
are dealing with, prolonging efficient response and appropriate cleanup.  
Therefore, strict regulation and enforcement of laws would prove beneficial to the 
environment. 
 
2.4 Chemical Spills 
 
Despite the great care exercised, accidents are inevitable and should thus 
be anticipated.  There is sufficient rationale behind why chlorine was specifically 
pointed out as a hazard by the Bomberos in Costa Rica.  Chlorine’s hazardous 
nature is illustrated by the August 2002 accident in a Missouri chlorine 
repackaging plant, where equipment failure led to the release of over 48,000 lbs 
of chlorine gas.  According to a report by the U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard 
Investigation Board (US CSB, 2002), the impact of the accident not only led to 
loss of life, but also widespread environmental damage.  Several people suffered 
inhalation related injuries, but most were evacuated before being exposed.  As 
the cloud of gas dissipated, everyone living in the path of the cloud had to be 
evacuated to avoid exposure. 
This leak had a lasting effect on the area surrounding the plant.  Nearly 
seventy percent of all chemical spills find a way to contaminate fresh water 
(Smith, 1981).  The local environment was devastated.  Plant life that came in 
contact with the cloud turned brown for a full year until new growth replaced the 
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damaged plant matter (Investigation Digest, 2002).  Were this repacking plant 
situated near agricultural lands, a huge risk of soil and crop contamination would 
have to be considered.  Gaseous leaks are very difficult to contain (Smith, 1981), 
and the only way to safeguard against them is to have an effective contingency 
plan, including adequate evacuation systems.  Even though contingency plans 
may save human life, the effect of chemicals on the environment still remains 
irreversibly destructive. 
Chlorine’s hazardous nature is further illustrated by the November 5, 
2002, accident in Las Juntas, Costa Rica (Appendix Q).  At a water treatment 
plant, a valve malfunctioned, releasing chlorine gas from a storage tank into the 
atmosphere.  The Bomberos quickly arrived to the accident scene, but because 
the valve was different from anything they had seen before, they accidentally 
opened the valve further in an effort to close it.  The impact of the accident not 
only led to loss of life, but also widespread environmental damage.  Several 
people suffered inhalation related injuries, but were evacuated before being 
exposed.  Everyone living in the path of the cloud of gas as it dissipated had to 
be evacuated to avoid exposure. 
The above is an example of a situation where the fire department was not 
prepared to deal with an emergency of such type and magnitude.  This is 
particularly relevant to Costa Rica, since according to Esteban Rámos, head of 
the engineering department for Bomberos, lack of adequate training is one of the 
causes of incident mismanagement.  In the Las Juntas plant, even though the 
emergency shutdown system was activated, a malfunction occurred because 
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some of the valves did not close within the required time.  It took emergency 
responder personnel hours to safely get through the dense cloud of chlorine gas 
in the proper suits and shut off the system manually.  No evacuation procedure 
was set in place for the surrounding area.  After further investigation, the 
Bomberos determined that the accident was caused by corrosion in the tank, and 
not in the valve.  
The environmental impact of the chlorine leak was severe.  The chlorine 
that settled to the ground killed the plant life instantly.  The smaller vegetation 
has since recovered from the chemical leak, whereas larger trees were still 
visibly damaged.  Residents also reported no other lasting effects from this spill 
on the environment.   
Fuels are volatile materials due to their inherent flammability.  This makes 
substances such as propane gas very hazardous to transport and store.  
Mishaps lead to large fires, explosions, and often death.  In the event of a leak, 
propane gas contaminates the surrounding communities as well as the soil.  Its 
combustion with oxygen in the air also adds to atmospheric pollution. 
In February 2003, a chemical plant in Alajuela Central, Costa Rica, caught 
fire (Appendix Q).  Leaking gasses such as propane, ignited, spreading the 
inferno.  As the fire worsened, pipelines carrying ammonia decayed and deadly 
levels of ammonia leaked.  The environmental contamination in this case was 
extensive to the immediate area, but fortunately, there was no nearby water 
source.  Nevertheless, the soil underneath the leak was contaminated and 
required cleanup. 
 14
The lack of information regarding location of hazardous materials is also a 
problem in Costa Rica.  On December 5, 2002, a highway construction crew 
ruptured a gas pipeline while repairing a highway (Appendix Q).  Figure 2 shows 
the punctured gas line as damaged by the crew.  The subsequent leak spilled 
into a nearby ditch, and was guided downhill into the area of a coffee shop.  The 
fire department made every effort to absorb the spill, as well as to shut off the 
flow through the pipeline.  Despite this, an unavoidable amount of contaminants 
leaked into the environment.  The environmental damage done by this accident is 
yet unknown because there was no system in existence to measure such effects.  
Another problem 
that underlies many fire 
departments all over the 
world is improper 
equipment management.  
This can lead to 
catastrophe, as 
exemplified by the leaking 
gas pipes of Guadalajara, 
Mexico.  On April 21, 1992, a series of nine explosions rocked the city of 
Guadalajara, taking out twenty blocks and killing two hundred people 
(http://www.corrosion-doctors.org/Localized/sewer.htm).  This was later 
determined to be due to corroded gas pipelines that had caused the explosive 
fumes to leak into the sewer system, and eventually up onto the streets through 
Figure 2: Oleoducto (oil pipeline) puncture 
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manhole covers and drains.  Evidence suggests that the gas was building up for 
hours before a spark finally ignited it, blowing a hole into the earth, swallowing 
buildings and cars, and taking hundreds of civilian lives. 
This catastrophe becomes even more tragic when one considers that the 
local fire department had evidence of the impending disaster.  For up to twenty-
four hours before the incident, local residents had been complaining of a strange 
fuel smell, headaches, and stinging throats and eyes.  Reports like these are 
valuable indicators, especially considering that often, local authorities are not so 
lucky as to have these precursors.  However, little was done in response to the 
complaints and the opportunity to shut off the gas slipped by. 
Evidence suggests that the fire department knew there was a leak from an 
unknown source but did not realize the gravity of the situation.  Some witnesses 
report seeing firefighters lifting manhole covers around the area to allow the gas 
to escape, suggesting their awareness that gas buildup was dangerous.  Had 
they known the source of the leak, more could have been done, however they 
were neither aware of the placement nor the condition of the pipeline underneath 
the street.  The warm climate and high humidity were later found to be 
contributors to the leak.  This information may have been useful in preventing the 
leak in the first place. 
 Like all fire departments, the one in Guadalajara had to make the best 
with what was available.  While firefighters will undoubtedly do their best to deal 
with any situations that come up in order to keep local people safe, lack of 
information or resources can impede their efforts.  For economically less 
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developed countries, lack of resources allocated to emergency management 
represents a risk to the lives of the firefighters and the people they protect, as 
well as to the environment of the country. 
On November 3, 2003 in Cartago, Costa Rica, a storage tank containing 
forty thousand-liters of super gasoline began leaking (Appendix Q).  The cause of 
the accident was corrosion to the metallic container.  The human impact was not 
very severe, unlike the 
Guadalajara example, 
because there were no 
human populations 
nearby.  However, the 
entire content of the tank 
leaked out, causing severe 
damage to the 
environment.  The tank, 
situated next to a dense forest, killed over twenty-five square meters of plant life.  
In addition, a nearby stream filled with gasoline, killing the fish and washing their 
carcasses up along the shoreline.  As seen in Figure 3, much of the vegetation 
has grown back two years later, but banks in the stream still contain gasoline.  
The thick smell of gasoline odor remains in the same area where the spill first 
occurred.   
Figure 3: Devastation of vegetation 
Similar to many other gasoline spills in Costa Rica, the courts came to no 
conclusions and thus no one had to pay for the clean up of the spill.  Without soil 
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and water samples analyzed by experts, there is no way to be certain that the 
contents of the tank polluted the surrounding area.  With a lack of funds, spills 
like these are left to linger for long periods.    
 
2.5 Improvements in Disaster Response 
 
When authorities are well informed of the risks in the area, emergency 
response yields a much more favorable outcome.  This is illustrated by the Texas 
City Fire Department’s recent handling of a British Petroleum refinery explosion 
on March 23, 2005.  Given the large number of refineries in the area, the fire 
department was well prepared to deal with the incident.  Although fifteen people 
are confirmed dead and over a hundred injured, the disaster could have been 
much worse (Easton, 2005), considering the vast quantities of petroleum 
processed. 
  The outcome of the 
2005 BP explosion was very 
different compared to a 
disaster that took place in the 
same city in 1947, namely 
because of the contrast in 
coordination of the emergency 
response.  By the end of the 1947 disaster, 576 people lost their lives and 178 
were never found.  In 1947, the explosion that started the chain of events was 
Figure 4: Texas City 1947 Disaster (source:  
                http://www.local1259iaff.org/disaster.html) 
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2,300 tons of ammonium nitrate, or the equivalent of detonating seven hundred 
tons of TNT (Guidelines for processing hazards, 2003).  Figure 4 illustrates the 
sheer magnitude of this explosion.  Considering a one-hour time lapse between 
the ignition of the fire and the enormous explosion, much could have been done 
to protect both the firefighters and the residents.  Had more information been 
available regarding the contents of the vessel and its destructive potential for 
emergency responders, this incident could have possibly been prevented or 
better contained.     
In the 2005 Texas City response, Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (OSHA) and the Texas City Fire Department were well aware of 
the hazards surrounding the petroleum plant.  The plant manager of the BP site 
has stated that he expects the explosion to affect operations by no more than five 
percent (Reuters, 2005).  Considering the explosion did not lead to a chain of 
events like the prior 1947 incident, personnel involved in emergency response 
preparations can be commended.  Although details of the explosion will take 
months to unravel, the continuing functionality of the refinery plant is noteworthy.  
 The accident response in the United States has dramatically improved, as 
can be seen in the above example.  According to Bennet, Feates, and Wilder 
(1982), prior fire responses consisted of dousing a fire with water.  Today’s 
computer systems, widely used by fire departments in the US, help them quickly 
identify the type of fire at hand and the appropriate response.  Today, firefighters 
have a wide variety of materials for fighting fires including high expansion foam 
systems.  
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The Bomberos of Costa Rica have also had significant improvements in 
their prevention of and response to chemical accidents.  In recent years, the 
number of chemical accidents has been decreasing.  In 2003 and 2004, over two 
hundred chemical accidents occurred in Costa Rica on a yearly basis.  Finally, in 
2005, Costa Rica had under two hundred chemical accidents.  The efforts of the 
Bomberos in their preventative measures have paid off greatly with increased 
attention to chemical hazards.   
In the United States, commercial transportation of such chemicals is highly 
regulated by uniform national standards.  This has led to a commendable safety 
record, taking into consideration that millions of tons of material, over 1.2 million 
times a day, are transported.  Unexpectedly, only ten out of 5,900 deaths to 
workers in America are caused due to hazardous materials (Murthy, 2002). 
The Department of Transportation (DOT) enabled the Hazardous 
Materials Transportation Act (HMTA), which regulates the marking, classifying, 
manifesting, labeling, packaging, placarding6, and spill-reporting provisions for 
hazardous materials in transit (Office of Hazardous Materials Safety, 2005).  One 
of the most important of these is the cargo manifest, or Material Safety Data 
Sheets about the chemicals being transported.  In case of accidents, these are 
used in order to evaluate the emergency response (US DOT, 2003). 
Costa Rica faces many obstacles before the transportation of hazardous 
materials becomes any safer.  Drivers operating trucks containing chemicals do 
not require special licenses.  On top of that, there are no accurate statistics from 
                                                 
6 Appropriate label identifying hazardous or other types of cargo 
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the government reporting the number of traffic accidents that occur in Costa Rica 
annually.  
 
2.6 Benefits of an Evaluation Tool 
 
Currently no quantitative method exists to accurately determine the 
environmental impact on any given area.  Without sufficient information about 
environmental damage, Costa Rica is left in the dark as to how much damage is 
being done to its ecosystems every year.  Moreover, the absence of this 
quantitative data makes it difficult to appropriately penalize the responsible 
parties.  Once the courts and the governing bodies fully realize the extent of 
damage being done, they would be more apt to enforce laws and regulations 
already in place more strictly.  With better enforcement of environmental laws, 
industries would be forced to reconsider their shipping and storage strategies in 
order to avoid large fines or other harsh consequences.   
 An evaluation tool would also serve the purpose of determining whether 
nature is capable of cleaning itself up.  In many cases the Bomberos, lacking 
extensive cleanup methods, leave chemicals in the ground from accident sites, 
hoping that nature will be able to fix the problems.  This is inappropriate 
considering the level of damage certain chemicals can have on plant and animal 
life for years to come.  With limited funds, the Bomberos require a simple 
evaluation tool that can determine whether a certain site requires further attention 
from environmental experts.   
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 There are many other benefits to having a database of this type of 
information.  For instance, this numerical data can be plotted on a GIS map and 
used to identify trends in the locations and levels of environmental damage in the 
country.  This information can then be used in education and research of all 
types, most importantly to conduct medical and environmental studies.  The 
prevention of future accidents can be performed by creating better safety 
measures or better industrial and commercial planning.  Identifying trends can 
also lead to a better understanding of the long-term health of Costa Rica’s 
environment.  
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Chapter III: METHODOLOGY  
 
3.0 Introduction to Methodology 
 
To expand the range of services that El Cuerpo de Bomberos provides to 
the Costa Rican people, the fire department wants to take into account the 
environmental impact caused by chemical disasters.  In order to strengthen this 
area of expertise, we have focused on establishing a model to determine the 
impact chemical accidents have on the environment.  Along with this objective, 
we made numerous recommendations to local law enforcement and other 
officials.  We planned to accomplish these objectives in the following three 
stages:  
1. Preliminary data analysis: 
a. Inventory and classify emergencies involving dangerous materials 
that have occurred in Costa Rica 
b. Establish the cause and other details of each emergency by looking 
into the type(s) of chemical(s) involved, number of causalities, units 
of Bomberos or paramedics involved, the economic cost incurred, 
and several other details 
c. Choose a diverse sampling of five accident sites varying in 
chemical type and land use including agriculture, industrial, and 
transportation. 
d. Research laws regarding chemical handling and transportation 
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2. Field Work 
a. Create an initial quantitative model as a basis for our final product 
b. Record any visible environmental degradation at the chosen 
accident sites 
c. Take soil, water, and air samples at these places 
d. Conduct interviews from relevant sources in the area 
e. Quantify the level of damage caused to the environment by these 
events 
3. Final analysis from field work 
a. Create a working quantitative model based on an algorithm that 
evaluates environmental damage  
b. Demonstrate methods to prevent future chemical accidents 
 
We were unable to fulfill all of the abovementioned objectives, and the reasons 
behind the changes in our project can be found later in this chapter.  
 
3.1 Preliminary Data Analysis 
 
The Bomberos already have raw data detailing past emergencies that 
have occurred in the country.  This data includes facts surrounding each accident 
and subsequent emergency operations, such as the number of firefighters at the 
scene, the number of casualties, the types and quantities of chemicals present, 
and a timeline of the disaster.  We focused our research on accidents that 
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occurred between 2002 and June 2005 in order to obtain the most recent and 
accurate information possible.  From the information recorded by the Oficina de 
Comunicaciones7 (OCO) in Tibás, we were able to gather data about the total 
number of chemical accidents that take place annually, as well as determine 
trends that exist within these events.  To reveal trends in accidents, we divided 
them by cause, such as leaks, gas escapes, or mechanical malfunctions to name 
a few.  We were provided with a short summary of all of the significant accidents 
that occurred each year by OCO, and together with the Bomberos, we chose 
from this list eighteen of the more serious and diverse accidents to study in more 
detail.  Our criteria for selecting these accidents were a wide range of chemicals 
involved, different geographic areas, and various causes for the accident.  
Finally, we reduced this list to group of ten accidents that we could visit and study 
in depth with the help of the Bomberos.  See Appendix P for the map of the 
accidents. 
The final sampling of accidents was chosen based on several factors.  It 
was very important that we chose accidents that were large enough to have had 
a significant impact on the surrounding environment so that there would be 
remaining evidence of this degradation available for study.  We also tried to 
include at least one accident from each year of study in order to compensate for 
changes in environmental conditions over time.  By including the variable of time 
in our analysis, not only could we project how much original damage there may 
have been in an area, but we were also able to better understand the long-term 
                                                 
7 Office of Communications 
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effects of chemical contamination.  The most important criterion in our selection 
of accidents was to be sure that there was a representative accident for each 
type of chemical that we had encountered in the database.  For instance, we 
planned to include at least one accident for each of the following substances: 
chlorine, LPG, ammonia, petroleum products, agrochemicals, and less common 
substances such as paint.  Finally, we chose accident sites that were dispersed 
around the country, considering Costa Rica is very diverse in its topography and 
ecology.  See Table 1 for further detailed information on each of the accidents. 
 
Table 1: Accidents by Location, Dates, and Further Information 
Location Date Chemicals Involved 
Quantity of 
Chemical Deaths Injuries
Limón Dec 8, 2004 Bunker 9,000 liters 0 3 
Zona Sur Aug 21, 2004 Gasoline and Diesel 
9,040 liters of 
gasoline and 
21,590 liters of 
diesel 
0 0 
Guanacaste Feb 29, 2004 Pesticide n/a 0 0 
Alajuela Oct 19, 2003 Ammonia n/a 0 5 
Alajuela Feb 21, 2003 Ammonia n/a 0 48 
Heredia Dec 5, 2002 Combustible Gas pipeline n/a n/a n/a 
Uruca Apr 11, 2002 Paint n/a – but known to be large quantity n/a n/a 
Cartago Jun 13, 2002 Chlorine 500 lbs 0 1,000 
Limón Jun 15, 2002 Combustible hydrocarbons 15,000 gallons 4 n/a 
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3.2 Fieldwork 
 
Once we had chosen the appropriate cases for further development, we 
began deciding how to assess the environmental damage in each place.  This 
knowledge was obtained by interviewing several local environmental experts, 
including Professor Eduardo Rivera from the University of Costa Rica (UCR); Ing. 
Álvaro Coto Rojas (Appendix J), an environmental engineer at RECOPE 
(Refinería Costarricense Petróleo8); Lic. Ana Lorena Arías of Surá (Appendix G), 
as well as several professors from WPI. 
After our initial observations of the accident sites, we took several soil and 
water samples.  We took multiple samples in different areas in order to 
compensate for any contaminants that would already be present in the water 
prior to the catastrophe.  We took a sample upstream from the accident to use as 
a control, while another was taken at the exact location of the spill to obtain the 
highest concentration of toxins.  We took at least one sample approximately 
twenty meters downstream from the accident in order to study how far the 
substance had traveled.  In areas where there was a lot of contamination, we 
took a second sample a hundred meters downstream for comparison (Appendix 
B). 
In order to avoid inaccuracies in sample collection, we extensively 
discussed with Lic. Ana Lorena Arías to find out exactly how soil and water 
                                                 
8 Costa Rican Petroleum Refinery 
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samples should be collected.  More information about these standard procedures 
can be found in Appendix G. 
The exact number and collection sites of samples cannot be determined 
unless several tests and return trips to the site are possible.  Since we could only 
visit each site for one day, we made an educated guess to determine from where 
our soil samples should be taken based on the biological indicators that we could 
observe.  The indicators we commonly searched for were concentrations of dead 
trees and bushes.  In order to determine the affected area, we tried to take at 
least one sample from outside of the area of the contamination radius as a 
control sample. 
We took soil samples by digging into the ground approximately twenty 
centimeters, since contaminants usually sink down with time.  In areas where the 
ground was harder and rockier, we dug shallower pits for testing.  Where the soil 
was loose and contained more clay, materials are more likely to sink deeper and 
therefore, our sampling pit was deeper.  In order to obtain the best sample 
possible, the area of the pit was twenty square centimeters.  We sealed the soil 
samples in plastic bags and gave them to the Bomberos to send to the lab for 
analysis. 
Unfortunately, lab tests on soil and water were not only very expensive, 
but also time consuming, limiting our study of this portion.  Therefore, we 
collected samples only at the first few sites that we visited, hoping this would give 
us a good idea of how much detectable contamination remains in an area after 
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an accident has occurred.  We, however, never received the results of these 
samples due to the reasons mentioned above. 
When dealing with toxic substances, it was important to exercise several 
safety measures.  Everyone at the site was required to wear boots to protect their 
feet, and gloves on their hands.  In areas of heavy contamination, we also wore 
masks over our mouths.  For extra safety, we wore long pants while walking 
around accident scenes, and were careful of where we stepped in order to avoid 
permeating our clothing with contaminated mud. 
Given the self-recovering nature of the environment, we were often unable 
to find adequate clues at the sites.  As a result, our interviews with the victims, 
local fire, police personnel, and medical expert interviews were important in our 
accident scene analysis.  We also interviewed local environmental specialists, as 
well as officials from the Ministerio de Salud, and MAG if relevant to the accident.  
These are the people that we felt would be most knowledgeable about the 
incidents.  We also approached them if they were mentioned in the OCO detailed 
incident reports. 
From these people, we obtained a description of the accident and the 
immediate effects to the people exposed to the hazard.  This was especially 
important in the case of atmospheric contamination, for instance by chlorine, as 
most of the substance is dispersed rapidly and will not be available to study after 
the accident.  A complete transcript of these interviews is shown in Appendix O. 
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3.3 Analysis of Fieldwork 
 
To perform a clear analysis of the results, we studied specific aspects 
such as soil and water contamination, and then compared them together to give 
us a bigger picture of the damage done to the area.  The accidents at the sites 
that we visited occurred months or years before our arrival, however, TEEICI is 
designed to evaluate chemical accidents soon after they occur (see Appendix E).  
Because chemicals break down over time, we had to take into account the 
amount of time that had passed between the accident and moment of study.  
Other considerations included possible sources of error such as faulty sampling 
techniques, miscommunication, or other nearby sources of contamination.   
As part of an initial evaluation, we qualitatively ranked soil and water 
contamination and used them as a basis to compare all the different accidents.  
This process is later discussed in § 3.6 Value-Weighting Process. 
 From these results, we were able to contrast areas of high impact with 
other areas that were relatively unaffected.  This analysis in turn was then the 
basis for our numerical scaling system.  It helped us set the higher and lower 
margins for our scale, as well as a general qualitative description for the different 
levels of damage (See § 3.6 Value-Weighting Process). 
We concluded that an accurate environmental assessment tool would be 
heavily dependent upon the type of chemical and the quantity released.  We 
used an EPA scale (Appendix R) that rated each chemical in terms of its severity.  
 30
We also took into account qualitative analyses such as observation of impact on 
the water, soil, air, animal life, and vegetation. 
 
3.4 Redefining the Project 
 
After having submitted the samples to the lab and waiting over two weeks 
without receiving results, we realized that we needed to redefine our project goal 
and reevaluate our objectives to make them more congruous to the time frame 
we were given.  Even if the samples were analyzed, we would have received the 
results much too late to be able to adapt them for usage and proper 
implementation in our model.  In addition to the time factor, the total cost for 
sample analyses for each site would have exceeded $640.  Upon further 
discussion with the Bomberos, we concluded that the price was too high, and not 
worth the data it offered.  Furthermore, we found out that the lab the Bomberos 
used could not analyze samples containing hydrocarbons—further dissuading us 
from using samples.  A very large part of the chemical incidents that occur in 
Costa Rica are in some way linked to the spillage of hydrocarbons, and not being 
able to analyze them would be meaningless.  We therefore concluded not to 
have any soil samples that we collected analyzed.  This consequently meant that 
the soil section in our model would have based on a qualitative analysis. 
Another setback we faced was trying to gather further information 
concerning the accidents we visited from the respective ministries and 
organizations in San José.  This proved to be a huge problem because it 
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involved driving to numerous locations and trying to pinpoint specific information 
within governmental organizations.  Often, interviewing officials in ministries was 
unproductive because they were unable to offer us relevant information. 
This, however, was not the only place where we had problems retrieving 
information.  When we lacked factual information from authorities, we had to 
depend on information from the victims, which was sometimes inaccurate or 
biased.  Occasionally, people would refuse to give us any information regarding 
the incident. 
As a result, we had to formulate our model based on the limited amount of 
information we had.  Nevertheless, we were able to produce a functional model 
that can be applied to future incidents with an operative level of validity. 
 
3.5 Analyzing and Formulating the New Model 
 
The list of methodologies that can be used to measure the environmental 
impact is rather extensive, and each one can be developed into as much detail 
as resources may allow.  In our particular case, the main limitations were time, 
amount of information available, and often, finances.  Nevertheless, with the help 
of experts, we were able to develop a functional model of TEEICI. 
In order to develop a successful model, it was necessary to take into 
consideration a series of factors to ensure that the final product was suited to the 
main cause—transmitting environmental impact data efficiently to authorities that 
may not be familiar with technicalities concerning environmental engineering or 
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the accident.  Firstly, we questioned whether the analysis methods had the 
capability of covering the wide range of combinations of variables that the model 
would have to incorporate.  For example, we had to ensure that we dealt with all 
aspects ranging from the area of soil contamination to the type of precipitation at 
the time of accident. 
Secondly, we had to ensure that the model was selective, and thus, it was 
important to select and include all pertinent variables and at the same time 
eliminate those that would not add further relevance to the project.  It was also 
important to eliminate irrelevant elements based on the opinions of experts and 
their experiences from past fieldwork and not in an arbitrary fashion.  We started 
with a series of the most important factors that the project’s impact would have 
on environmental contamination and its wellbeing; this helped us generate the 
primary group of indicators.  Once we had this group of indicators, we 
determined and assigned values to them based on their relevance of impact. 
In addition, we also had to ensure that the methods used in the model 
were exclusive.  This means that the method was capable of eliminating the 
common problem of counting certain aspects multiple times due to the 
interrelated nature of the environment.  For example, we can analyze the 
characteristics of a chemical from several different perspectives: its toxicity to 
either human health, towards vegetation, or towards fauna; its reactivity with 
different elements in nature; or that of its residence time in soil, just to mention a 
few. 
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Objectivity is another important property that the method must possess.  It 
was fundamental to minimize the subjectivity that we may bring to the project.  As 
non-residents of our sample space, Costa Rica, we were often unaware of local 
conditions or public sentiment concerning environmental issues.  As a result, 
after interviewing experts as well as talking to locals about the environment, we 
had to reprioritize and add importance to aspects that we may have deemed less 
important or vice versa. 
The magnitude of finances available, the availability of computers, access 
to information databases, scientific programs used to model specific 
circumstances, and access to laboratory testing are some of the important tools 
necessary for the development of this type of study.  However, they are also 
some of the limiting factors that we had to take into account while creating the 
model.  We had to ensure that we did not include elements in the model that 
could not be easily measurable without an array of scientific instruments.  
Consequently, a large part of the evaluation techniques are qualitative and can 
be carried out without requiring much equipment. 
In addition to these limitations, time was one of the most significant factors 
that we considered in the designing of the product.  The Bomberos needed an 
evaluation tool that they could put to use on-site, and one that did not require 
analyses of samples in laboratories or further studies.  Therefore, even though 
analyzing soil and water samples would yield more detailed results, the 
Bomberos merely needed to know the extent of impact the accident had on the 
environment.  We also set threshold limits on the levels of environmental impact, 
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i.e. if the assessment yielded an impact of over seven out of ten, we 
recommended that the Bomberos carry out further detailed studies on the 
accident site as well as look into cleanup methods.  Accident sites that rated 
below three out of ten were very likely to recover without the need of human 
intervention.  In conclusion, the results from our model would notify the 
Bomberos of the level of significance each accident must be given and 
consequent actions that need to be taken, if any. 
 
3.6 Value-weighting Process 
 
Our scale runs from zero to ten, where zero means no environmental 
impact, and ten signifies extreme and often irrecoverable damage.  The model is 
divided into two main parts: the base section and additional situational factors 
that affect the impact.  The base section is directly related to two factors, the type 
of chemical in interest, and the quantity in which it was released.  We used a 
scale from the USEPA that narrows down the classification process based on its 
chemical properties, its interactions with natural elements such as soil, water, 
and air, its residence time in the environment after it has been released, as well 
as disposal information.  All these factors combined determine its placement on 
the X, A, B, C, D scale, where X is the most dangerous chemical, and D, the 
least.  This was greatly helpful because without it, we would have had to classify 
chemicals ourselves according to some of the abovementioned factors, which 
would have been a time-consuming and tedious process.  The USEPA scale is 
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not only more accurate than what we would have generated, but also more 
comprehensive, as it lists over 22,000 chemicals and their respective 
classifications.  In addition to the five types of chemicals, we also added other 
substances frequently used in Costa Rica, and gave them point values.  These 
point values would then be multiplied by another set of values that would be 
dependant on the quantity of the chemical.  The values given are shown in the 
following Table 2 and 3. 
 
Table 2: Base number calculations for highly toxic chemicals 
 
Type of Chemical 
 X ? 0.8    quantity of chemical (liters) 
 A ? 0.7   x 10: >1500 
   9: 1300 – 1500 
   8: 1100 – 1300 
  7: 900 – 1100 
  6: 700 – 900 
  5: 500 – 700 
  4: 300 – 500 
  3: 100 – 300 
  2: <100 
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Table 3: Base number calculations for moderately toxic chemicals 
 
 B ? 0.5 
 C ? 0.3 x quantity of chemical (liters) 
 D ? 0.1 10: >35,000 
  9: 27,500 – 35,000 
  8: 20,000 – 27,500 
  7: 15,000 – 20,000 
  6: 10,000 – 15,000 
  5: 7,500 – 1,000 
  4: 5,000 – 7,500 
  3: 2,000 – 5,000 
  2: 500 – 2,000 
  1: <500 
We assigned the following values to the additional substances: 
 Bunker (combustible) ? 0.8 
 Gasoline, Diesel, and other hydrocarbons ? 0.6 
 Organic waste (septic tanks, molasses, etc.) ? 0.6 
 
Since chemicals in category X are the most toxic, we gave them the highest point 
value.  The rest of the chemical types have lower values based on their 
classification.  For instance, Bunker (crude oil #2), a hydrocarbon, has a higher 
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value assigned than gasoline, diesel fuel, and other hydrocarbons due to its 
augmented danger level.  For a complete value-based analysis, see Appendix C. 
On the one hand, if five thousand liters of gasoline leaked into the soil, 
ninety-five percent of it would evaporate within the first twenty-four hours.  
Bunker, on the other hand, creates a stronger bond with the compounds in the 
soil.  It is also denser than gasoline, meaning it will not evaporate as readily into 
the air (Appendix J).  Organic waste is generally not considered hazardous to the 
environment; however, when a septic tank containing large amounts of organic 
waste overturns, the danger level immediately increases.  Certain compounds 
found in organic waste in large quantities are difficult to break down, and lead to 
the production of noxious fumes that are harmful to vegetation and animals.  It is 
these factors that aided us in appropriately assigning point values to these 
substances (Appendix H). 
The chemical-type value is further modified by the quantity in which it is 
released.  A higher release quantity gains more points due to the higher damage 
that it would cause.  The product of the chemical-type and the quantity released 
yield the base figure.  For example, when 850 liters of a category X chemical is 
spilled, a base value of 0.8 × 8 = 6.4 is generated. 
The second part of the model is comprised of all the additional factors that 
affect the environment after an accident and are specific to each site.  This 
section is further divided into soil type, weather conditions, and effects on water, 
flora, and fauna.  Each one of these sections has a variety of choices that the 
assessor can choose from, and has different point values.  These functions are 
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to be added on to the previous base figure obtained from the type and quantity of 
chemical. 
The type of surface that the chemical spills onto is an important factor to 
take into consideration due to several reasons.  The hardness of a surface will 
determine how much of the chemical will permeate into the ground and how far it 
will spread.  We do not consider a spill onto a paved surface as severe as on soil 
because the chemical will not be able to permeate through concrete as much as 
it would through soil.  However, the problem paved surfaces pose is that they 
increase the area that the chemical spreads out due to runoff.  This problem can 
be further worsened by the presence of rain, in which case the substance can 
possibly flow until the paved surface ends.  This said, the problems associated 
with soil are a lot more severe.  Depending on the substance’s density, it will 
permeate deep into the ground.  This has several problems associated with it.  
Firstly, it will kill all subterranean animal life and may even affect roots of trees.  
Secondly, it is possible that the chemical may enter an underground water 
source, contaminating it.  This could be particularly dangerous if the water source 
is used for drinking. 
Soil cleanup is very time-consuming, tedious, and expensive.  Cleanup 
can be approached in two ways: the contaminated soil could either be bulldozed 
and deposited in another area, or the soil could be chemically leached of the 
hazardous substances.  However, the latter requires extensive pumping over 
long periods of time, and may cost up to seventeen million dollars per hectare for 
comprehensive cleanup, according to Ing. Álvaro Coto Rojas from RECOPE. 
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(see Appendix J for interview).  The problem could be made worse if the spill 
took place on sand or a loose type of soil, since the chemical would permeate 
deeper as well as over a wider area.  Therefore, in degree of increasing severity 
to the environment is sand/loose-soil, moist soil, and least of all, paved surfaces. 
Weather conditions play an extremely important role in determining the 
impact that a chemical may have on the environment.  Rain is a significant 
aspect because it has the capability of spreading the chemical over a larger area 
and increasing the area of contamination.  Therefore, heavy rain is a lot more 
hazardous to the environment than a drizzle or light rain, and thus carries a 
higher point value.  Heavy rain is also dangerous because there is a possibility 
that water may react with the chemical, such as sodium (Senese 2005). 
In the case of a gas leak, wind plays a similar effect.  We found that there 
were several ways to approach assigning points to such a situation.  A gas leak 
on a windy day would mean that the cloud of gas would be dispersed, reducing 
the concentration and associated danger.  However, it also means that a larger 
area would be affected once the gas starts to sink, if denser than air.  In contrast, 
if there were no wind, the gas cloud would stay in the area and have more severe 
effects within that particular zone.  After much deliberation, we decided that the 
effects on the environment would be worse if a larger region were affected, thus 
assigning more points to high wind speed.  Often, a cloud of gas can head 
towards forests or nature reserves, where they can have devastating effects on 
the vegetation, soil, animals, and the ecosystem on a whole. 
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Vegetation can be easily affected by any type of spill or other chemical 
accidents due to its dependence on the soil quality.  Given the large probability of 
soil being affected in a chemical accident, we decided to add points based on the 
area of soil contamination.  Several ranges from five hundred to two thousand 
square meters of soil contamination were created, and the larger areas were 
assigned higher point values, decreasing with lower areas of contamination.  In 
addition, we added points depending on the type of vegetation area affected.  
More points were given if the vegetation in a natural reserve or primary rainforest 
was affected, and fewer if it was a secondary forest.  Natural reserves and 
primary forests are extremely important to the ecosystem as well as to the 
heritage of Costa Rica, and it is therefore only appropriate that any damage done 
to them be reflected with a high point value.  We also added points if plants were 
burnt or killed immediately after the spill.  If the plants died upon instant contact 
with the chemical, this was a clear indicator of the high toxicity of the substance, 
as well as demonstrative of the damage that would be done over a longer period 
with the presence of the chemical. 
The vegetation and soil conditions make up an essential part of the 
dwelling for animals and other fauna present.  Costa Rica prides itself in being 
the habitat of numerous endangered and protected species, and any damage to 
such populations would be a great loss, justifying the addition of a large number 
of points.  To make our evaluations more precise, we decided to make a 
distinction between wildlife and domestic animals since they do not live in similar 
conditions and therefore, cannot react to an accident in the same way.  For 
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example, in case of a chemical spill, wildlife will be able to flee the contaminated 
area to ensure their safety, whereas domestic animals that are kept in an 
enclosed area do not have the ability of escaping.  As a result, we assigned 
higher points to the death of animals in a non-enclosed area because despite 
their efforts to escape the hazardous area, the effect was so widespread that 
they had no chance of survival.  Furthermore, we added points if a large number 
of animals, such as twenty, in a non-enclosed area were killed, since this clearly 
suggests the widespread and severe nature of the impact. 
Chemical spills cause runoff of the substance and there is a very large 
possibility that it may end up in a body of water.  From our research, we 
observed that a large sum of accidents in Costa Rica are comprised of spills 
caused by overturned trucks on highways.  Given the large number of streams 
and rivers that flow throughout the country, the probability of water contamination 
is very high.  We believe that contamination of such streams has grave 
consequences because they merge into rivers, which lead into the ocean.  
Therefore, every time a spill runs off into a stream, large bodies of water are 
affected.  The vegetation surrounding the streams and rivers are affected as well, 
and depending on the quantity and type of substance spilled, populations of 
marine life are destroyed.  Here, we took into consideration different speeds at 
which water may be traveling.  Fast-flowing rivers are not as much of a risk as 
slow-flowing rivers because in the latter case, the chemical has more time to get 
absorbed into the riverbed and affect the riverbanks.  As a result, we gave a 
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stagnant body of water more points than a fast-flowing river.  Further points were 
also added if fish or other organisms were killed. 
 Since a lot of hazardous material enters the country via seaports on both 
the Pacific and the Caribbean side, there is a possibility that an accident may 
occur at these locations, contaminating parts of the sea.  However, given a need 
for a quick assessment, we only implemented basic, qualitative indicators.  We 
added points if any contamination was visible either in the water, on the sand, or 
other areas surrounding the spill.  More points were added if any marine life is 
killed or damaged.  The Caribbean coast is very rich and is home to many 
protected species such as turtles, dolphins, or coral, and it is essential that in 
case of any effect on them, their deaths carry a large point value. 
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Chapter IV: RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
 
Each incident that we had the opportunity to study taught us something 
valuable about environmental assessments.  By researching in depth as many 
sites as time and resources allowed, we observed first hand the effects of several 
different types of accidents.  This helped our understanding of major factors that 
improve or worsen an environmental situation.    
With every new case study, we understood a little more about the 
common causes of accidents involving hazardous materials in Costa Rica.  
There were a number of consistencies in every case.  At each accident site, an 
expert from the Bomberos or other organization would give the opinion of how to 
improve the manner in the handling of the accident.  Some of these responses 
were more common than others.  After observing the trends that exist between 
the cause of the accident and its response, we have been able to indicate 
several areas that are in need of improvement.   
The simplest way to convey this information is by reporting on an accident 
one at a time.  The following accidents took place within the last four years.  We 
have summarized our observations, as well as the information provided by the 
personnel involved in the following pages.  We obtained some of the information 
first hand through interviews with victims (Appendices L, M and N).  We 
uncovered other details by interviewing bomberos and police that responded to 
the accident, as well as other informed experts of the case.   
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4.1 Individual Accident Analyses 
 
The accident sites that we visited are further analyzed and discussed in 
the following sections. 
 
4.1.1 Nosara, Nicoya, Guanacaste – February 29, 2004 
 
Señor Emertio Araya, a farmer from the small town of Nosara in the 
province of Guanacaste, approached his usual products supplier for a chemical 
he could use to deparasite his cattle.  He was referred to a product called 
Metafox™ (Remason 1211) by his usual supplier, and told to apply it directly onto 
all of his cows.  Approximately one year later, Sr. Araya and his son prepared the 
compound and applied five gallons of it to the cattle.  Within minutes of 
application, they noticed that the cows started knocking into each other violently, 
and then dropped to the ground.  Sr. Araya’s son began coughing violently soon 
after the cows showed these first symptoms.  Realizing the presence of a 
problem, Sr. Araya dialed 911 at three pm.  The closest emergency response 
unit, located in Nicoya, forty kilometers away, arrived at the scene approximately 
two and a half hours later.  Also present at the site was the local Fuerza Pública9.  
The Cruz Roja immediately took Sr. Araya’s son to Liberia Hospital due to his 
grave condition.  He suffered from respiratory problems and loss of sphincter 
                                                 
9 Police Force 
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control.  He was placed on glucose drip and was hospitalized for eight days 
before released (Appendix L).   
In order to ensure the safety of the public, forty people in a hundred-meter 
radius were evacuated for ten hours.  An isolated zone was created such that 
nobody could enter the contaminated area.  Representatives from the Ministerio 
de Salud as well as the MAG visited the site for evaluation purposes.  The 
Ministerio de Salud advised Sr. Araya to burn and bury the twenty-one cows and 
two bulls.  Sr. Araya accordingly burnt and buried the cattle in two separate pits 
that were four meters deep and twenty meters wide. 
Upon visiting the site of the incident, we investigated the two pits where 
the cattle were buried, as well as the site 
where they were sprayed with the 
Metafox™.  The burial sites showed no 
signs of contamination.  Vegetation on and 
around the area seemed normal, and if 
any damage had been done, full recovery 
had taken place.  In addition, we were 
informed that the cattle currently raised on 
the farm feed from the areas that were 
previously contaminated and there have 
been no additional problems.  The family had also not experienced any adverse 
effects on their health. 
Figure 5: Collection of soil samples 
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Figure 6: Canister containing 
Metafox™ 
We took two soil samples from the affected area (see Figure 5), 
approximately ten square meters, in the barn where the cattle were sprayed with 
the chemical.  The original canister, shown in Figure 
6, contained the product was also taken to the 
laboratory for analysis.  Unfortunately, we were never 
able to analyze these soil samples because of cost 
constraints.  It costs eighty thousand Colones ($168) 
to analyze one sample, and a good site analysis 
involves at least three samples from the same area, 
according to Lic. Ana Lorena Arías of Surá.  In 
addition, since this was within the enclosed area of 
the corral, there was no way of judging if any damage 
to vegetation or soil was present. 
After interviewing officials from the Ministerio 
de Salud, we found that the product used was actually a weed killer rather than a 
deparasiting chemical, and thus toxic in the quantities applied to the cattle.  
Metafox™ is a moderately toxic chemical that is absorbed through the skin and 
can cause severe respiratory problems.  In cases of contact with high 
concentration or prolonged exposure, death may result.  However, we also found 
that the chemical was an organophosphoric, meaning it would break down 
naturally over time in the soil and render itself inert.  This is probably why the 
area had shown no signs of damage only a year later.  Hence, we knew that our 
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evaluation system should describe this accident as reversible, independent of 
human intervention 
Officials from Ministerio de Salud as well as the Bomberos also suggested 
other possible reasons for this incident to have taken place.  Since neither Sr. 
Araya or his son are literate, they were not able to read the canister containing 
the chemical.  It is very likely that they did not follow the correct instructions on 
how to dilute the compound to a usable quantity.  The resulting high dosage 
might have been the reason why the cattle died almost instantly after being 
applied with the Metafox™.  This incident could also be attributed to the fact that 
they used the chemical a year after purchasing it.  According to the Ministerio de 
Salud, it could have passed its expiration date and have turned into a more toxic 
compound than intended, leading to undesirable results (refer to Appendix L for 
interview with Ministerio de Salud). 
In order to evaluate the environmental impact of this accident, we entered 
the details into our algorithm, which yielded an overall impact of 3.9 out of ten.  
This rating is in the lower percentile, leading us to believe that this accident only 
had a slight impact on the environment.  This is consistent with the fact that no 
vegetation, soil, or water sources were affected.  However, the death of domestic 
animals did add to the environmental impact.  
We chose to not classify domestic animals with wildlife since they are 
contained in an enclosed area and in case of an accident they do not have the 
capability to run away to protect themselves, while wildlife will immediately flee at 
the first sign of danger.  Moreover, the cattle in this case were part of the primary 
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cause of the incident, and thus, their death cannot be recognized as an 
environmental impact. 
The human impact of this accident was rather large for Sr. Araya.  The 
total loss of cattle amounts to around eight million Colones (US$ 17,000) – which 
is a considerable amount of money not only to a farmer in rural Costa Rica, but 
anywhere in the world.  In addition, the fact that his son had to be hospitalized for 
eight days adds to the severity of the situation. 
At this site, we discovered that when only vague reports from authorities 
were available to us, we had to depend on information from interviews that was 
not always reliable.  Sr. Araya, for instance, informed us that fifty-six cows were 
killed, when in actuality twenty cows and two bulls were killed.  In addition, he 
insisted that the same thing had happened at another farm where more than forty 
cows were killed, but we could find no records of such incidents with either the 
police or fire department.   
In this case, clearly labeling the product would not have helped, but there 
should be some system in place to be sure that farmers are using chemicals 
correctly and not contaminating their own farms and livestock.  However, it 
appears that any investigation into this case was not extensive, and the cows 
and Sr. Araya’s son paid the consequences. 
 
 
 
 
 
 49
4.1.2 Zeledón, San Rafael Norte, San Isidro - November 19, 2004 
 
The international highway in the southern part of Costa Rica is an 
important artery to the economy of the country.  Everyday, this highway is heavily 
traveled by hundreds of tanker trucks, transporting a wide variety of materials 
from the Atlantic coast into San José and other major cities.  Sometimes the 
contents of these trucks are harmless food products, such as bananas or farm 
animals, but often they contain toxic chemicals that are dangerous to people and 
the environment.   
 There are many characteristics of this route that make it dangerous to 
travel.  The highway twists through the mountains south of San José for many 
kilometers, and in most places, the roads are extremely steep and winding.  A 
thick fog often obscures visibility because of the high altitude, which is nearly 
three thousand meters above sea level.  Moreover, tankers are often not labeled 
or labeled incorrectly, creating an even more dangerous situation.  This means 
that in case of a spill, it can take local authorities hours to identify a chemical.  
Despite all of these dangers, truck drivers will often speed down these roads in 
an effort to accomplish as much as they can in as little time as possible, in order 
to increase their earnings.  For the same reason, they will also work extremely 
long hours, depriving themselves of sleep and thus inhibiting their driving 
abilities.  
In November 2004, a tanker carrying both regular gasoline and diesel 
traveled along this highway in San Isidro.  The driver had been speeding for quite 
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some time, and as a result of the immense amount of friction on the brakes, they 
heated up to temperatures that degraded the material.  As the tanker approached 
a turn in the road at the bottom of a hill, the brakes failed completely, sending the 
tanker off the road and causing it to overturn, as seen in Figure 7. 
 Fortunately, no one was 
injured in this particular accident, 
however, all of the contents of 
the tanker leaked directly onto 
the side of the road.  In order to 
prevent surface runoff, the local 
fire department deposited soil on 
the gasoline to absorb as much 
of the chemical as possible and 
prevent the spread of 
contaminants.  The Bomberos also used dikes to contain the fuel (Appendix N).   
Figure 7: Overturned truck in San Isidro 
Weeks later, a leaking tank of water two hundred meters further uphill from 
the accident washed the contaminants into a stream.  This waterway is one of 
the many small tributaries running into a main river in the area that supplies the 
local people with potable water.  There are two water-treatment plants in the 
area, one downstream and one upstream from the point at which this tributary 
joins the main river.  At the plant downstream from the leak, workers noticed 
unusual substances in the water and closed off pipes supplying water to the 
community (Appendix N).   
 51
 Upon visiting the site of the accident in June 2005, there are still visible 
effects of the pollution in the soil and stream.  Upstream from the spill, the local 
flora is healthy and green, and the stream is relatively clear, with a layer of green 
moss covering the rocks.  However, at the site of the spill, long reddish brown 
moss covered the rocks, indicating contamination.  There are also several dead 
plants and trees near the stream, illustrating the effects that the chemical had on 
the soil.  A few centimeters into the streambed, directly underneath the new red 
soil spread over the spill, is a thick layer of blackish-gray soil emitting a strong 
odor of gasoline.  This condition is present along the stream from the area of the 
spill to a nearby drain, which directs the stream underneath the highway. 
 This incident represents a risk to the surrounding environment.  The 
waterway transports the pollution further downstream and eventually to the 
ocean, depositing gasoline on the banks of the tributaries and main river.  The 
stream will take a very long time for full recovery and may not be completely 
clean for decades to come.  As gasoline sinks into the soil, the groundwater 
becomes more contaminated, a condition which is unavoidable and very difficult 
to remedy.   
 When we applied our model to this accident, it yielded a 5.1 out of ten 
level contamination.  This number is higher than the first case for a few reasons.  
One important factor is the presence of a stream, which can carry contaminants 
as far away as the ocean, affecting wildlife along the way.  While there appeared 
to be no affected animals, the vegetation clearly suffered and the soil remains 
very contaminated.  The human impact in this case is high because the stream 
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connects to a main river, which supplies the water treatment plant.  In addition, 
the costs of response for the Bomberos were high in terms of equipment and 
materials used.  Any cleanup would require an enormous amount of money, 
possibly in the hundreds of thousands of dollars. 
 We obtained more information than applies directly to the environmental 
aspect of this accident.  A representative from the local water treatment plant 
explained that there is no contingency plan in place in case of a spill directly into 
the facility.  Currently, the water is filtered only by allowing it to run through tanks, 
filtering out solids, and then treating it with chlorine before distribution to the 
public.  In case of a spill, the responsible oil company is obligated to provide a 
carbon filtering system to the plant.  Local people who depend on this water 
supply are informed by word of mouth following the plant’s announcement that a 
spill has occurred.  Apart from these measures, there is no way to clean the 
water or provide the local people with a different water source. 
 
4.1.3 Highway Cajon de Pérez Zeledón, La Ese – August 21, 2004 
 
On August 21, 2004, a truck carrying 21,500 liters of diesel fuel and nine 
thousand liters of gasoline drove off the highway in San Isidro, spilling its 
contents into a stream directly below.  The cause of the accident was operator 
error.  The driver, who had been driving for two days straight without resting, had 
fallen asleep at the wheel.  The accident had an immediate and severe effect on 
the environment.  Residents reported spotting hundreds of dead fish floating on 
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the surface of the water and washing up on the banks.  Plants in the area began 
to shrivel soon after the accident occurred because of the level of contamination 
to the soil (Appendix M).   
The immediate area of damage was approximately fifty square meters, but 
because of the presence of a river, fuel flowed many kilometers downstream, 
causing much more damage to the environment.  The fuel did not ignite, and all 
of the spill washed directly into the stream and soaked into its banks.  The fire 
department could do little to contain the spill because most of the material had 
washed downstream prior to their arrival.  They followed standard procedure to 
contain the spill with dikes and sand, but gasoline sank into the soil, where it 
remains today, inhibiting the growth of new plant life. 
When we first arrived at the scene, there was a heavy smell of fuel in the 
air, and wreckage from the truck remained at the side of the road.  As we 
proceeded down the slope from the road approaching the stream, we noticed 
that certain plants were affected more than others were.  For instance, most of 
the underbrush seemed to have no long-lasting problems.  Many of the larger 
trees, from the road down to the stream, were dead or had dead branches.  From 
these observations, we could only imagine the severity of the chemical spill when 
the accident occurred almost a year ago.  Despite the effects of the spill still 
visible on the environment, we were surprised to see that fish had returned to the 
stream. 
About ten meters downstream remained a very strong smell of gasoline.  
Soil along the riverbank looked either black with gasoline or reddish, covered 
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Figure 8: Gasoline contamination 
with algae, as can be seen in Figure 8.  Even in places where the vegetation 
seemed healthy, a strong odor and visible contamination remained.  We took 
water and soil samples from the area of the river closest to the spill, as well as 
ten meters downstream 
where contamination was 
carried and fifteen meters 
upstream from the spill in 
order to obtain a control 
sample.  Our intention was to 
study the level of 
hydrocarbons still in the water 
a year after the spill had taken 
place, however, we were unable to analyze the samples because of the costs 
involved. 
This accident yielded a level of 8.1 in our analysis.  While it was very 
similar to the August accident, which had occurred on the same highway, there 
were a few distinct differences.  The base number in our analysis for this case 
was very high because of the huge amount of chemical spilled.  In addition, there 
were hundreds of fish killed because of the water contamination in this incident.  
Entire trees were also killed at this accident scene as opposed to just a few of the 
branches that we had seen at the previous site.  Finally, because of the greater 
size and velocity of this river, more contamination was carried downstream, with 
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visible effects on the streambed.  This accident had the highest severity of the 
sites we were able to visit.  
 
4.1.4 Total Gas Station, San José, June 6, 2005 
 
On June 6, 2005, the San José fire department began receiving calls from 
local citizens reporting headaches, and the strong smell of gasoline in the area of 
the Total gas station.  Both the Ministerio de Salud and hazardous materials unit 
responded to the scene and found that an underground gasoline storage tank 
was leaking directly into nearby streams.  The hazardous material unit evacuated 
the surrounding area and emptied the underground tanks, flushing them with 
water, in an attempt to prevent more chemicals from seeping into the ground.   
We learned of the details surrounding the Total gasoline leak by speaking 
with Álvaro Sánchez Campos and two Tibás Bomberos in a small group 
interview.  Although two weeks had passed since they responded to this 
accident, the Bomberos still had unanswered questions.  For instance, they were 
sure that there was a gasoline leak, but could not determine if a tank or a pipe 
was leaking, or how far down the leak extended.  Unfortunately, since they did 
not have control of the area, they had to wait to be able to examine the pipe 
system, a frustrating dilemma for the Bomberos.  Meanwhile, gasoline continued 
to leak into the surrounding area (Appendix O). 
When we asked the Bomberos what they could do to improve such a 
case, they expressed a desire for the public to be able to recognize such 
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Figure 9: Total gas station 
emergencies and call the fire department early.  There is a lack of awareness 
surrounding hazardous substances that could be remedied if the people who 
lived in high-risk areas were educated 
about the danger.  We were told that 
the resources and training was 
adequate to deal with this situation, if 
only they could have gotten there 
sooner to stop the leak. 
Another source of frustration 
was that the Bomberos could not gain 
control of the scene.  Because it was 
on Total property, they could not enter 
the scene of the accident after they 
first responded (see Figure 9).  This meant that the Bomberos could not 
appropriately remedy the situation and stop further environmental damage.  This 
puts the whole area at risk, making the residents vulnerable to sickness because 
of exposure.    
In the absence of officials to interview, we talked  to the people living 
nearby in hopes of gaining some more details.  Three women spoke to us who 
lived with their family next door to the gas station and next to a stream where 
much of the contamination had leaked.  They told us that someone had been 
taking samples, but that the stream was polluted prior to the accident.  From 
what residents told us, the stream remained polluted for some time with visible 
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trash and discoloration of the water.  The oldest of the women complained that 
she had been living there all of her life and in the past few years it had 
deteriorated to this condition.  Unfortunately, she did not have the resources to 
move away. 
The Bomberos were under the impression that the Ministerio de Salud had 
been taking samples from the Total accident, so we traveled to the main office in 
San José in order to speak with a representative.  In their investigation, they 
found that the gas station had been operating under an expired license for two 
years.  This was because the tanks, including a drainage tank, which held the 
runoff gasoline and oil underneath the ground, could not pass required 
inspections.  We learned that previously the station had operated with an expired 
license for a year as a Shell station.  Unfortunately, the Ministerio de Salud does 
not have enough time to check on all of the gas stations to be sure that they have 
licenses, and the problem went unnoticed until an accident occurred.  The 
Ministerio de Salud was unable to conclude whether the leak originated from a 
drainage tank, gas tank, pipe, or any combination of possibilities.  In this 
particular incident, the Ministerio de Salud had jurisdiction over the site because 
they were in the process of investigating this matter (See Appendix O).  
Consequently, the Bomberos could not gain access to the site, as they normally 
would at other accident sites.   
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In the United States, environmental experts would have had greater 
authority in a similar case.  Under the RCRA10 amendment, courts can 
expediently open private property to experts studying the damage done to the 
environment.  Quicker action means that chemicals have less opportunity to 
damage the environment and spread to surrounding areas.  
From further investigation at the Ministerio de Salud, we learned that they 
never took samples, but believed that MINAE had.  The Ministerio de Salud 
representative reluctantly informed us that different agencies do not collaborate 
on what information is collected or by whom.  Perhaps most importantly, 
agencies collect this information but rarely do they combine it into a full report.  
There is no protocol for collaborative data collection, but there is certainly a need 
for one.  Once again, we found ourselves being told by a government 
representative that she wished for more communication between ministries.   
This accident was rated as a six out of ten.  Approximately 53,000 liters of 
gasoline leaked into the soil and the stream.  The fact that the tanks had not 
been removed makes the leak a continuous problem.  Since the pollution had 
been so bad as to give people headaches, we factored this into our human 
impact number.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
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4.2 Model Evaluation and Improvement 
 
Once hearing our project description, both Professor Eduardo Rivera of 
the University of Costa Rica (UCR), and Lic. Ana Lorena Arías of Surá said that 
given the time and resources we had, the project as it was defined, was not 
achievable, for it would be like converting rocket science into a coloring book.  
According to them, we needed not only more expertise in the field of 
environmental risk management engineering, but we would also need more 
manpower if we were to collect samples and visit all ten of the past accident 
sites.  Our knowledge as students was very limited in this field, and thorough 
analysis of samples was beyond our capacity.  For a comprehensive 
environmental impact assessment to be executed, we would have to take into 
account all the variables involved with the accident.  This would include 
considering chemical properties such as dilution levels in bodies of water, or their 
residence time in soil (See Appendix G).  Determining such information would 
take up a considerable amount of time.  Conversely, omitting this level of detail 
would not be detrimental to the creation of our final product.  Therefore, even 
though we wanted to include as much detail as we could in our final model to 
increase the validity and accuracy, it was beyond the scope of this project as well 
as our knowledge.  This meant that the newly defined product would be more 
basic than originally intended. 
Turning to expert sources for help, we found that for the most part they 
had difficulty offering us constructive feedback, due to the extensive nature and 
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depth of our goal.  Lic. Ana Lorena Arías was one of the few experts that offered 
us resources to improve our model.  In addition to experts, we also turned to 
research material for reference.  From our research, we found that even though 
impact evaluations had been done individually on soil, water, air, flora, or fauna, 
there were no models that considered all the aspects.  These individual models 
were far too detailed for us to implement and still conserve the Bomberos’ goal of 
creating an easy-to-use model.  As a result, we formulated the whole model 
ourselves, which is why we presented it to as many experts as possible with the 
intent of gaining their approval and implementing their recommendations. 
The first person to look over our work was Ing. Álvaro Coto Rojas, an 
environmental engineer from RECOPE.  He advised us to redefine the 
classification of animals that we chose to use.  There is a distinction, for instance, 
between rare animals, protected species, and endangered species.  It is a very 
different matter for ten endangered wild cats to perish as opposed to ten dogs.  
As a result, we have added different categories of animals to our model and 
given them different levels of importance.  He also reemphasized the importance 
of distinguishing between domestic and wild life, as previously discussed in 
Chapter III (See Appendix J). 
Apart from this, we were advised to reassign values to some of the 
chemicals involved in our analysis.  While the EPA categorizes all petroleum 
products together, diesel fuel, according to Ing. Álvaro Coto Rojas and Lic. Ana 
Lorena Arías, is much worse in water than regular gasoline (Appendix R and 
Appendices H and J).  Diesel fuel has a low vapor pressure, meaning it has a low 
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tendency to evaporate into air.  Bunker, another petroleum product containing 
MTBE11, is still worse for the environment and is considered among the worst 
environmentally threatening chemicals.  MTBE is an additive in gasoline that 
helps cars burn fuels cleaner.  MTBE is highly miscible in water, and has been 
found in many water sources in the United States.  Certain states including 
California banned the use of MTBE in 2002.  As a result, we assigned bunker a 
high level of 0.8, as opposed to its previous value of 0.6.  
 There are many knowledgeable environmental engineers at Surá.  We had 
the opportunity to speak with Lic. Ana Lorena Arías once again, as well as a 
coworker of hers who is also an authority in environmental assessments.  
Several other factors, which required attention, became clear to us and because 
of these meetings; the model was revised once again. 
Lic. Ana Lorena Arías’s colleague was satisfied with the structure of our 
system but thought that it was incomplete as far as the details that we chose to 
consider.  The first thing that he noticed was that we needed more detail about 
the weather at the time of our accident.  The speed of the wind is not complete 
enough to describe where the chemicals will spread (Refer to Appendix I).   
Furthermore, the types of surfaces that the spill takes place on will also 
determine how quickly the chemicals are washed away or soaked into the 
ground.  We have added a category for type of surface into our system because 
of these findings; differentiating between concrete, hard ground, and soft soil.  
Other factors also contribute to how fast the chemical is carried to other areas by 
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waterways.  The inclination of a river is important, for instance, since a steep 
river will carry chemicals downhill rapidly.  If a spill occurs next to the ocean, the 
currents and tides needed consideration in the model.  We had not included the 
possibility of water changing direction before this, and had only considered rivers.  
The dilution of the chemical in the river is also very important.  While this is 
something that we felt was important to consider in our model, we could not take 
it into account because of the need for a tool that requires easy-to-collect 
information.   
One very important point that was brought up was that our model should 
come with a full explanation.  This requires us to write a manual for proper usage 
of TEEICI by the Bomberos.  This manual should include a time limit for valid use 
of the model.  The tool is made for use by the Bomberos right after a chemical 
accident has occurred and is not valid after twenty-four hours after the accident.  
The Bomberos should be fully aware of this, as well as any other conditions for 
use of the system.  However, the explanation should be short enough that any of 
the Bomberos can read quickly at the scene of an accident and immediately be 
able to run it.  A copy of this manual is attached in Appendix D. 
Lic. Ana Lorena Arías’s comments echoed those of her colleague as well 
as those of Ing. Álvaro Coto Rojas’ from RECOPE.  She also asked that we re-
categorize some of the chemicals that the EPA scale did not mention in enough 
detail.  For instance, organic waste is very dangerous in large amounts and 
should be categorized with gasoline and other petroleum products.  We were 
also urged to consider the reversibility of accidents in the definitions of each level 
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of contamination.  With the primary purpose of the tool being for use in court, it is 
imperative that it be sound enough to endure cross-examination; therefore, we 
need the approval and input of as many experts as possible to improve and 
calibrate the model (Appendices J and H).   
TEEICI has great potential, but will be limited without the data stored 
accessible for anyone who wishes to use it.  This means that a database will 
require accessibility to many private and government agencies and have the 
ability to store vast quantities of separate incident reports.  Our research 
unfortunately has shown that creation of a database with easy file sharing will be 
very difficult.  This is because firstly, not all government offices have access to 
computers, and secondly, there is no file system that all offices can easily 
access.  In addition, most government offices have more work to attend to than 
they can handle, and adding further responsibilities would not be plausible in 
terms of time, personnel, or finances. 
In order to obtain the details surrounding each accident that we studied, 
we traveled to many different companies and agencies to conduct interviews.  
This can take days, since important information is often scattered among 
different organizations and pertinent witnesses are sometimes unavailable.  The 
information recorded by authorities following an accident is often incomplete, 
requiring interviewees to fill in gaps of information, which may be biased.  A full 
accident report and conclusion is never coordinated between separate ministries, 
making the process of piecing together an incident much more difficult.  
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The leak at Total is typical of the accidents that we have studied.  Many 
different experts from the Ministerio de Salud, RECOPE, A y A12, as well as the 
Bomberos have told us that there is very little communication between 
organizations researching and reporting hazardous accidents.  Police records are 
vague, and the ministries involved often do not collect all the required 
information.  Such gaps of information lead to the lack of enforcement of certain 
issues, and those at fault are subsequently not held responsible.  In the Total 
case, even though the operation license had expired, the station was in service, 
unnoticed by the proper authorities.   
The result is that accidents such as the Total gas station are rarely 
pursued, and so the owners hardly ever have to take responsibility for their lack 
of care.  The local environment, as well as the people who are forced to live in 
areas of the city contaminated by toxic chemicals, has to pay the price for the 
polluter’s negligence.  One family that has been living near this particular gas 
station for many years pleaded with us to remedy the situation, since they do not 
have the resources to move away.  
Another disturbing trend that we have come across while collecting the 
details of each accident is that in almost every case the cleanup performed is 
inadequate.  In most cases, nothing is done to remedy a spill, and the chemicals 
are left to leach into the ground or seep into nearby waterways.  This happens for 
a number of reasons.  Sometimes the identity of the chemical is unknown, or 
there is no available method for cleanup.  Spills are absorbed with foam and 
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sand or contained with dikes, but the contaminated soil is rarely cleaned or 
removed. 
Often, there is a lack of cleanup due to confusion of who is responsible, 
another aspect of the prevalent communication problem.  In San Isidro, the 
company at fault for an oil spill was asked to remove the contaminated soil but 
refused because of the enormous expense.  No conclusion was reached 
because authorities did not further press the issue.  The gasoline sank deeper 
into the soil, killing plants and animals and leaking into a nearby water supply.   
Even when companies do take responsibility, there is little that they can 
do.  The environmental engineer at RECOPE explained in his interview that it is 
illegal to use bacteria to clean-up oil spills outside of the RECOPE facility 
because of a lack of information.  Before they can begin to use this method, there 
must first be a study of the environmental impact of the bacteria to see if they 
impact flora or fauna.  
One alarming trend that we uncovered throughout our research was that 
many times there is preventative information available that is ignored by the 
authorities.  One case of this was concerning the locations of underground gas 
lines.  Gasoline leaks are often caused by highway repair crews that accidentally 
puncture underground gas lines.  At first we were told by the Bomberos that the 
road crews do not know where the lines are because they are not marked, 
however, according to RECOPE, this is not true.  Upon visiting RECOPE, we 
learned that they indeed do map all of their pipelines and distribute these maps 
to all of the local authorities.  Last year they held nine meetings with Cruz Roja, 
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the Bomberos, municipalities, National Commission of Emergencies, and local 
emergency commissions encouraging the use of this information.  When we 
asked them to explain why these maps are not used, the Bomberos as well as 
Ing. Álvaro Coto Rojas could not explain.   
We have also found that areas of high risk to chemical accidents have no 
warning systems in place to alert people of dangers such as toxic drinking water.  
The Bomberos already use GIS to map fire hydrants and locations of dangerous 
incidents, and we find that it would be beneficial for them to use these systems to 
map out areas of high risk.  The Bomberos could give these areas special 
attention and contingency plans in case of an accident.  For instance, gasoline 
stations and refineries could be mapped out and monitored.  In the case of the 
Total gasoline station leak, when asked what they wish could have been done 
better, the Bomberos hazardous materials team stated that they wish the local 
people had called them sooner.  If this area were previously identified as high 
risk, information could be distributed to the neighboring families instructing them 
on the signs of a chemical leak and what actions to take. 
Many accidents in Costa Rica were caused or worsened by the absence 
of proper labeling.  Improper labels on trucks shipping dangerous materials often 
prevents local authorities from learning what is being spilled after an accident 
occurs.  To make matters worse, trucks shipping non-hazardous materials are 
commonly labeled with hazardous materials stickers as a matter of style (see 
Appendix K).  This is very dangerous to the people in the area of an accident as 
it can take hours for the Bomberos to find out what they are dealing with.  By this 
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time, it may be too late to do anything in the way of cleanup, or warn the local 
people to stay away from the area. 
In other cases, tanks and valves can be mislabeled, preventing first 
responders from using emergency shutdown systems properly.  In one case, 
during a chlorine leak, the Bomberos unknowingly worsened a situation because 
of a lack of instruction labels on the tank.  The Bomberos were accustomed to a 
particular type of valve commonly used at similar facilities that works in the 
opposite manner.  When they approached the tank, their experience told them 
that the valve on the tank was open and needed to be closed, when in actuality, 
the valve was already shut.  Thinking that they were closing off the flow of 
chlorine gas, they opened the valve, allowing more to escape and worsening the 
situation.  It is unfortunate that a simple label could have prevented this 
development.  It should be clearly indicated on tanks how to operate safety 
valves and emergency shutdown systems so that the Bomberos do not have to 
make guesses in a dire situation (Appendix Q).  
The lack of contingency planning for many different scenarios in areas 
around the country is distressing.  In many areas, there are absolutely no 
evacuation plans.  In fact, there are hardly any systems to alert the public of 
emergencies apart from word of mouth.  There are areas with water treatment 
facilities that have no plan for chemicals that spill into the water supply.  In 
addition, because areas of high risk remain unidentified, local authorities are 
sometimes not ready to deal with them.  In contribution, there are many areas 
without a fire station, slowing response time to several hours.  
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Evacuation and public alert systems should be in place everywhere in the 
country, but in the absence of such measures, it is important that these plans be 
in areas of high risk, such as storage facilities and well-traveled shipping routes.  
The water treatment agency, A y A, informed us that the public alert system in 
Costa Rica is based on word of mouth.  When an accident occurs, the local 
government heads are informed of the situation, after which it is their 
responsibility to ensure that citizens in their area understand what has happened.  
While this may work in small communities, it is not a reliable way to spread 
information and can certainly be improved. 
 In May 2005, an event in La Fortuna, a mountain town in the center of the 
country, illustrated the need for more fire stations and better access to remote 
areas.  A supermarket burned to the ground without attention from the 
Bomberos.  The nearest station is hours away from La Fortuna, a town located at 
the base of Volcán Arenál.  This lack of safety is present in many areas of the 
country. 
 The Bombers are in need of many more facilities.  Unfortunately, they do 
not have the resources to build fire stations in all of the areas that need them.  
However, in the absence of a fire station, there should be some local authority 
with the knowledge to respond to an emergency such as a fire or a chemical spill.  
The local people cannot be left to their own devices in the case of such an 
emergency.   
 The lack of resources in this country has prevented the adequate upkeep 
of all of the road systems, but this is still a matter of safety that authorities must 
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address.  We have found that in Costa Rica some of the roads have severe 
damage and are in need of immediate attention as seen in Figure 10.  Poor road 
conditions delay emergency crews from reaching accident scenes in a timely 
fashion and can also be the cause of accidents.  Some possible factors that 
would be appropriate for analysis include the tendency for mudslides to occur 
and the severity of potholes in the road. 
Despite having had interviews 
with representatives of many branches 
of government including the police, the 
Bomberos, Ministerio de Salud, and 
several others, we were unable to 
obtain statistics on traffic accidents or 
transportation accidents involving 
chemicals.  We were also unsuccessful obtaining information regarding the level 
of law enforcement in Costa Rica, such as number of traffic tickets given out for 
speeding and violations regarding hazardous materials.  Without this basic 
information, we cannot be certain whether police are doing all that can be done 
to prevent chemical accidents. 
Figure 10:  Dangerous road conditions 
When asked what contact the Bomberos office of engineering has with the 
USEPA, we were told that they have none at all; however, they are very 
interested in such contacts.  This has become clear to us in our work because 
the authorities in the engineering office have asked us to base some of our 
assessment on systems that are already used by the USEPA.  We believe that 
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while environmental attention here should be based on local attitudes and 
values, there are many potential advantages to setting up relations with INS and 
the USEPA.  For instance, there are many research studies available to the 
USEPA that would also be useful to the Bomberos.  It would be beneficial to 
share this information internationally. 
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Chapter V: CONCLUSIONS AND RECCOMENDATIONS  
 
Costa Rica faces extensive problems posed by the chemical industry.  A 
large issue is that a proper system is not in place to facilitate communication 
between government branches.  This creates a climate where the passing of 
legislation and law enforcement are extremely difficult.  As a result, chemical 
accidents are frequent, often not cleaned up, and those that are responsible for 
chemical incidents are not held accountable.  
The Bomberos require the development of an environmental assessment 
tool that serves two purposes:  
1. Assesses the overall impact a chemical incident had on the environment 
to be used at the Environmental Tribunal, the purpose of which would be 
to hold people responsible for the level of damage they cause to the 
environment,  
2. Determines whether nature is capable of recovering without the need for 
human intervention.  
By utilizing TEEICI, which can perform the aforementioned functions, the 
Bomberos have a tool that will assist them in making the environment a cleaner 
place. 
Before the Bomberos can begin use of TEEICI, we have some concerns.  
The tool requires further testing on more accidents in order to determine the level 
of accuracy evaluating the damages.  In addition, TEEICI would best serve the 
nation of Costa Rica if the information obtained from the tool were shared with 
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concerned branches in the government.  If the judicial system in Costa Rica 
starts accepting TEEICI as valid evidence, it will have a profound effect and hold 
people accountable for their destructive actions against the environment. 
In Costa Rica, standard means of determining the environmental damage 
of chemical incidents are not appropriate.  Funding to determine the level of 
damage done to the environment by chemicals is extremely limited in Costa 
Rica.  Most environmental studies cost thousands of dollars and require many 
weeks for a team of well-trained experts to determine the full extent of damage.  
In Costa Rica, governmental organizations sometimes have problems gaining 
access to sites, especially when they occur on private property.  TEEICI assists 
the Bomberos work around these dilemmas. 
TEEICI requires no costly lab results, and information needed for the 
device can be collected in a matter of hours; not weeks.  The financial cost of 
making a fast and accurate environmental evaluation with this device is virtually 
none.  Because data for TEEICI does not take very long to collect, a full 
environmental study can be made directly following the stabilization of a chemical 
accident scene.  This will allow the Bomberos to make a complete environmental 
assessment of a scene, even if it occurs on private property.  TEEICI, with further 
testing and calibration, has the potential to be a widely used tool by the 
Bomberos.  It will make presenting data to courts easier, which in effect will hold 
those at fault accountable for these accidents. 
The nature of our research lead us to many different offices around the 
country to gather accident information.  Throughout this process, we encountered 
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ways that public and private agencies might improve their levels of efficiency.   
The information gathering process for any researcher in Costa Rica is tedious 
because of infrequent communication between different branches of government.  
Given the quantity of obstacles we came across while conducting our research, 
we compiled a list of recommendations that should make the process easier in 
the future.  Many of these recommendations have the potential to be explored by 
WPI students conducting IQPs.   
1. Creation of a Central Database    
We propose a central database containing details of each accident.  This 
database would be available in hard copy or online, with the responsibility of 
maintaining and updating the system under a single organization.  The 
responsible organization would need to have the funds to keep the system well 
updated, which would be optimal for the Bomberos who have the necessary 
resources. 
2. Appoint Emergency Response Personnel in Rural Areas 
Remote areas need to be assigned a point person who is given some training 
and a plan to deal with emergencies.  This person could be a volunteer, a police 
officer, or even a local citizen.  
3.  Remedy Areas Needing Road Repairs 
Improving road conditions in rural areas would allow easier access for 
emergency personnel.  This project would involve uncovering areas of high 
needs and recommending where to best direct funds for road repairs, obtain 
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sources of revenue, and suggest changes for the movement of hazardous 
materials to safer routes.  
4. Educate Students about Environmental Danger 
A project could investigate changes to the curriculum to make people more 
aware of these issues or explore the possibility of raising public awareness. 
5. Increase the Authority of the Bomberos 
The Bomberos need more authority to investigate accident sites after they have 
been stabilized.  Legislation needs to be passed so that the Bomberos and other 
government organizations may begin cleanup more quickly, and identify causes 
of chemical accidents to hold those at fault accountable.  
6. Establish Relations between the Bomberos and USEPA 
The Bomberos are interested in the environmental regulations that exist in the 
United States.  Case studies could also be shared in this relationship to further 
the understanding of the effect chemicals have on the environment.   
7. Create Contingency Plans in Areas of High Risk 
Communities near facilities housing vast quantities of hazardous materials 
require contingency planning in the case of an accident.  Areas of high risk need 
identification and proper plans for adequate response. 
8. Increase Accurate Signage on Vehicles 
It would be very beneficial to impose harsher penalties on drivers that mislabel 
their trucks.  A project could also be done to improve the course truck drivers 
must take before obtaining their licenses.  
9. Study the Use of Bacteria for Consumption of Hydrocarbons in Oil Spills 
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Before bacteria can be used to clean up spills of petroleum products, a study 
must be conducted on the environmental effects of the bacteria. 
10.  Global Applications of TEEICI 
There are many countries in Central America that would benefit from an 
environmental assessment system, especially less developed nations that may 
not have the resources to carry out extensive investigations.  Costa Rica could 
lead these countries in utilizing TEEICI and other environmental programs. 
The Bomberos alone cannot carry out the suggestions stated in this 
section.  It is crucial to develop better lines of communication between separate 
branches of government for these recommendations to be followed through.  
Future projects with WPI would definitely help fix the problems we encountered in 
our project, as well as raise more concern and appreciation for the environment.    
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APPENDIX A – El Cuerpo de Bomberos 
 
A governmental umbrella organization, the INS (Instituto Nacional de 
Seguros), was founded in 1924 with the aim to respond to and deal with the 
protection needs of Costa Rican society.  Over time, INS has evolved to offer a 
wide range of protection services to its people, from financial security to safety 
from chemical accidents.  INS currently incorporates eleven agencies that 
provide healthcare, banking services, and an organization similar to OSHA 
(Occupational Safety Hazard Administration), which deals with occupational risks 
to the Costa Rican public. 
El Benemérito Cuerpo de Bomberos, or the firefighting department, is now 
a part of the parent group INS but was founded much earlier in 1865.  Costa Rica 
lay exposed and vulnerable to dangers such as fires.  In January 1864, one of 
the grandest houses in San José caught fire and was destroyed.  At this point in 
time, an adequate fire protection system was not in place, and thus caused 
uproar amongst the Costa Ricans.  This is when the Governor of San José 
proposed that a fire truck be imported from the United States.  The truck arrived 
a year later in June 1865, and in July that year, the Cuerpo de Bomberos was 
officially formed. 
During the early 1900s, arson grew in Costa Rica mainly due to fraudulent 
insurance claims and other such activities.  To combat this, several laws were 
passed that would prevent claiming false insurance compensations, and in 
addition, ten percent of the premiums paid by fire insurance was to be devoted 
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towards acquiring new firefighting equipment (http://www.ins-
cr.com/esp/Historia). 
El Cuerpo de Bomberos has progressed through the use of technological 
advancements and the improvement of response rates, made possible by 
numerous external grants and studies.  It continues to strive to improve the 
infrastructure by adding more technology that will better help assist the Costa 
Rican population of four million.  
A simple organization structure defines the Cuerpo de Bomberos.  The 
Director, Héctor Monge Montero is the head of the entire Cuerpo, followed by 
Ana María Ortega, who is the information manager.  There are then two main 
subdivisions: technical and administrative, as shown in the Figure 11 below.  
During this project, we will be working with Ing. Esteban Rámos González from 
the Ingeniería de Bomberos (Technical Subdivision), who is in charge of 
investigations and risk management, as well as fire prevention and education.  
La Dirección de Bomberos (the Administrative Subdivision) is headed by Chief 
Héctor Chaves, who is responsible for overseeing the general operation of all 
sixty-one fire stations in Costa Rica.  This subdivision is then further divided into 
an Administrative and General Services section. 
Since 2001, the budget for the Bomberos that is provided by INS has been 
increasing eight percent annually since 2001.  They have an annual budget of 
$26.5 million and the rise comes directly from increasing insurance premiums 
and taxation of teachers’ salaries.  The allocation of these resources is controlled 
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by La Dirección de Bomberos.  This office also oversees policy management for 
the entire department. 
There are a total of 540 fulltime firefighters and one thousand volunteer 
firefighters dispersed throughout the sixty-five fire stations located in the country.  
Each fire station is assigned a specific zone that becomes their prime 
responsibility in the event of an emergency, although other stations often assist 
neighboring units.  Each fire station has two to three fire trucks, and at least one 
paramedics unit.  On average, there are twelve firefighters and two paramedics 
on duty at any given time.  La Oficina de Comunicaciones (OCO) is located in 
Santo Domingo and receives all national fire-related 911 calls.  Three technicians 
coordinate these calls and dispatch the appropriate units nationwide.  The 
dispatchers are also responsible for coordinating responses in the event of an 
accident, collecting information, and making detailed reports about each incident.  
In addition, three fire stations around the country are specially equipped to deal 
with chemical incidents.  The primary station is located in Tibás, and there are 
two other smaller stations in Puntarenas and in Siquires. 
The Bomberos are concerned about the environmental impact caused by 
the large number of chemical accidents.  After an accident has occurred, several 
other governmental organizations ask the Bomberos for an evaluation of the 
environmental impact.  To their dismay, they have never been able to adequately 
report on this aspect.  It is our task to help them fill in these gaps of information 
by setting up an evaluation process that they can use onsite immediately after an 
accident. 
 Organigrama de Bomberos
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APPENDIX C – Model with Weighted Values 
Model to determine the environmental impact of chemical 
incidents 
 
(Divide final number by 10 to yield environmental impact quantification) 
 
Base Functions 
 
 
Type of Chemical 
 X ? 8    liters of chemical 
 A ? 7  x   10: 1,500+ 
   9: 1,301 – 1,500 
   8: 1,101 – 1,300 
  7: 901 – 1,100 
  6: 701 – 900 
  5: 501 – 700 
  4: 301 – 500  
  3: 100 – 300  
  2: < 100 
 
  
 Bunker ? 8 
 Gasoline Products ? 6 
 Organic Waste ? 6 
 
 
 B ? 5 
 C ? 3 x liters of chemical 
 D ?1 10: >35,000 
  9: 27,501 – 35,000 
  8: 20,001 – 27,500 
  7: 15,001 – 20,000 
  6: 10,001 – 15,000 
  5: 7,501 – 10,000 
  4: 5,001 – 7,500 
  3: 2,001 – 5,000 
  2: 500 – 2,000 
  1: < 500 
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Additional Functions 
 
• If the chemical is more dense than water + 1 
 
 
 
Type of Surface 
 
• Pavement + 2 
• Wet soil + 4 
• Sandy/Loose soil + 5 
 
 
In case of Gas 
 
• If gas cloud is heading towards natural reserve + 4 
• Wind speed 
o No wind + 2 
o Breezy (~5 kph) + 3 
o Windy (>10 kph) + 4 
• In case of rain 
o Drizzle + 1 
o Normal + 3 
o Strong + 5 
 
 
Water 
 
• If river or stream present + 5 
• If stagnant water present + 3 
 
• Water speed 
o More than 16 kph  + 0.5 
o Less than 16 kph + 1.5 
o Slow + 2 
 
• Sea 
o If visible contamination in sand or water + 2 
o If accident occurs close to habitat of protected species + 5 
o Death of marine life + 4  
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Flora 
 
• Natural reserve + 6 
• Secondary forest + 4 
• If plants burn or die instantly + 3 
• Area of soil affected: 
o >2000 m2  + 9 
o 1,501-2,000 m2 + 8 
o 500 – 1500 m2 + 5 
o < 500 m2  + 3 
Fauna 
 
• Protected species + 9 
 
• Death of fish + 6 
 
• If animals die in a non-enclosed area + 9 
• If a large number of animals (>20) die in a non-enclosed area + 10 
 
• If animals die in an enclosed area + 7 
• If a large number of animals (>20) die in an enclosed area + 9 
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APPENDIX D – Instructions Manual (in Spanish) 
 
Guía para utilizar el modelo 
 
Introducción 
Ésta guía es intencionada para el empleo del Modelo para determinar el impacto 
ambiental de accidentes químicos.  Ésta es una herramienta básica y sencilla 
que se puede usar para evaluar el daño hecho al medio ambiente después de un 
accidente. 
 
El modelo es estructurado básicamente como un formulario.  Al llenar todos los 
campos pertinentes, el programa calcula y lo muestra automáticamente el 
impacto ambiental.  El modelo está basado en un programa que se llama 
MicrosoftOffice™ InfoPath™ 2003, y es ideal para llenar unos formularios y 
almacenar en una base de datos. 
 
Favor recuerda que eso es una herramienta sencilla y por lo tanto no es 
absolutamente preciso.  Sin embargo, lo hemos desarrollado a un nivel en que 
puede confiarse en los resultados.  El número de impacto ambiental que recibe 
es una culminación de varias variables encontradas en la escena del accidente; 
entonces, es esencial que el asesor ingrese los detalles el mismo día o no serán 
válidos los resultados. 
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La escala 
El número de impacto ambiental es entre 0 y 10, donde 0 significa ningún 
impacto, y 10 el impacto extremo.  Los siguientes son descripciones generales 
de los impactos para darle al asesor un sentido de la escala y no son pautas 
fijas. 
 
 0  Ningún daño ha ocurrido.  El área está en la misma condición en que 
sería si no hubiera un accidente. 
 
 1       Hay algún daño, pero al nivel más mínimo posible.  El área afectada 
repondrá rápidamente.  No hay ninguna muerte. 
 
 2      Ocurrió daño en una cantidad pequeña, que se arreglará dentro de un año 
sin intervención humana.  Si hay muertes, fueron por el incidente en si 
mismo y no por la contaminación. 
 
 3      El pequeño daño se remediará en unos años sin intervención humana.  
Hay algún daño a la vegetación. 
 
 4      Hay daño visible a la vegetación y quizás a unos pocos animales o peces. 
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 5      Ocurrió una cantidad moderada el daño.  Algunos animales o alguna 
vegetación están destruidos, pero es probable que recuperarán sin 
intervención humana en una decena de años.  Si hay algunas muertes 
por contaminación, son pocas.  Es posible que la contaminación que 
queda se haga el área insegura para más exposición. 
 
 6      Un área grande se ha dañado.  El suelo es bastante contaminado y es 
posible que no recuperará pronto.  Por consiguiente, la flora y la fauna 
son afectadas también. 
 
 7      Mucho daño ha ocurrido.  Unos animales mueren y la vegetación está 
sufriendo.  Es posible que se contaminó una masa de agua.  El suelo 
también está contaminado e impidiere el crecimiento de la vegetación. 
 
 8      Ocurrió daño severo.  Un área grande de vegetación está contaminada.  
La fauna está afectada y posiblemente hay una gran cantidad de sus 
muertes.  La recuperación está posible solamente con intervención 
humana, pero tardará varios años.  Ésta área será peligroso para los 
humanos y otros seres vivos. 
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 9      Una gran cantidad de daño extremo ocurrió.  Una gran área del ambiente 
está destruida.  Si el área puede recuperar, necesitare muchos años y un 
esfuerzo extenso para la limpieza.  El área está altamente tóxica y es 
peligrosa en caso de exposición. 
 
10  Son los peores accidentes que han ocurrido a lo largo de la historia 
documentada.  Se usa éste nivel si un área muy grande fue 
completamente devastada, e involucran muertes de ambos animales y 
humanos.  Un accidente de tal categoría está irreversible.  Ésta categoría 
puede también ser usada en caso de la exterminación de una especie 
particular. 
 
Recomendamos que si un accidente califique más de 6, que haga estudios más 
detallados sobre el accidente el asesor.  Creemos también que para un 
accidente que reciba más de 5, sería difícil y prolongada recuperarse la 
naturaleza sin intervención humana de la limpieza. 
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El uso del programa 
 
Hemos creado el programa así que sea tan intuitivo a utilizar para el asesor. 
 
I. Datos generales 
 
Éstos primeros seis campos son información general acerca del accidente y no 
afectan el número de impacto ambiental. 
 
 
II. Información sobre el químico 
 
Ésta sección está dividida en dos partes, y debe llenar solamente una sección.  
Para determinar cual tipo de químico es, debe referirse a las tablas adjuntadas 
de EPA, en que se clasifica cada químico par X, A, B, C, o D. 
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Si el químico de que trata sea Bunker, X, o A, elija unos en la parte arriba y 
escoja un rango describiendo la cantidad.  Si no se trate de éstas sustancias, 
siga las mismas etapas en la sección abajo.  Note bien que debe seleccionar 
solamente una de las dos secciones para que el programa funcione 
correctamente. 
Llena la casilla si la sustancia es más densa que agua.  Esto aumenta el riesgo 
que lleva un químico al medio-ambiente. 
 
Si se trata de un gas, debe llenar ésta sección 
también.  Los estados del tiempo son 
importantes en caso de fugo de gas porque 
puedan determinar como va a reaccionar el 
gas. 
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III. Detalles locales 
Debe seleccionar el tipo de superficie en que la 
sustancia se derramó.  Si no aparece el tipo de 
superficie exacto, elija lo que está el más 
parecido.  En la mayoría de los casos, sería tierra 
húmeda; pero por ejemplo, si hay un derrame en una carretera, aunque el 
químico está en una superficie pavimentada, va a llegar a la tierra, donde los 
efectos serían más marcados, entonces es mejor elegir tierra en tales casos. 
 
Es posible que el 
químico entre en una 
masa de agua – agua 
estancada, una 
quebrada, un río, o el mar.  Es importante seleccionar la velocidad porque afecta 
mucho el impacto ambiental. 
 
Seleccione el tipo de 
área que se afectó.  Es 
importante determinar 
si fue una reserva natural o la clasificación del bosque.  Si la vegetación en ésta 
área murió instantáneamente al llegar en contacto con el químico, elija la última 
casilla.  Hay varios rangos del área afectada que puede seleccionar también. 
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Si había animales que 
fueron afectados, debe 
llenar ésta sección.  
Elija la primera casilla 
si fueron afectados 
animales de una especie protegida. 
Hemos diferenciados entre animales silvestres que viven en un área no-cercada 
y animales domésticos que viven en un área cercada.  Dependiendo del caso 
apropiado, seleccione las casillas. 
 
Después de tratar todos los detalles relevantes, el programa va a calcular 
automáticamente el impacto ambiental.  Éste es 
mostrado abajo de la página. 
Algunas veces, es posible que éste número exceda de 10, y eso indica 
claramente que el accidente fue de una gran escala. 
 
Es posible crear una base de datos con ésta información.  Puede guardar cada 
informe en un servidor central que alguien puede conseguir a cualquier 
momento. 
 
 
Para más información o ayuda, no hesita de contactarnos a LosBomberos@wpi.edu  
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APPENDIX E – TEEICI 
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 95
APPENDIX F – HERT 
HERT- Human and Economical Ramification Tool 
 
Location of Accident:__________   
Chemical(s) released:____________ 
 
Deaths/Life Threatening Injuries/Permanent Injury  _____ 
1-5 +10 
6-15     +20 
16-25     +25 
26-50     +35 
51-75     +45 
76-100    +50 
101-125    +60 
126-150    +70 
151-175    +80 
175+     +85 
 
 
Non-Life Threatening Injuries     _____ 
1-5 +5     
6-15 +10 
16-25 +15 
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26-50 +20 
51-100    +25 
101-150    +30 
151-200    +35 
201+     +40 
 
Bomberos Injured or Killed      _____ 
1-5 +10 
6-10 +20 
11-20     +30 
21+     +40 
 
Number of People Evacuated      _____ 
1-20 +3 
21-50 +6 
51-100 +9 
101-150 +12 
151-200 +15 
201-350 +18 
351-500 +21 
501-1000     +24 
1001+      +27 
(add 2 points for every day evacuated) 
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Drinking Water Contaminated      _____ 
      
Each Additional Day    +2 
(Example: total of 4 for 1 day 
6 for 2 days) 
 
Number of Days Businesses Closed      _____  
1-3 Days     +2 
4-7 Days     +4 
7+      +6 
 
Value of Chemicals Leaked      _____ 
5,000,000-15,000,000 colones    +3 
15,000,001-25,00,000 colones  +6     
>25,000,001 colones   +9 
 
Estimated Cost of Cleanup in ₡     _____ 
(even if none happened) 
10,000,000-20,000,000   +3    
20,000,001-35,000,000   +6 
35,000,001-50,000,000   +9 
50,000,001-75,000,000   +12 
75,000,001+     +15 
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 Cost of Chemical Disposal in ₡      _____ 
5,000,000 – 10,000,000   +3  
10,000,001+     +6    
 
Property Damage in ₡ (structural)     _____ 
1,000,000-5,000,000   +3 
5,000,001-10,000,000   +6 
10,000,001-20,000,000   +9 
20,000,001-40,000,000   +12 
40,000,001-60,000,000   +15 
60,000,001+     +18 
 
Property Damage in ₡ (cattle, vehicles, crops, other)  _____ 
1,000,000-5,000,000   +3 
5,000,001-10,000,000   +6 
10,000,001-20,000,000   +9 
20,000,001-40,000,000   +12 
40,000,001-60,000,000   +15 
60,000,001+     +18 
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Population Density (km2)             _____ 
1-20 +1 
21-50 +3 
51-100 +5 
101-150 +7 
151+      +9 
 
Final Quantitative Number      _____
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APPENDIX G – Interview with Ana Lorena Arías 
Environmental Engineer: Surá Soluciones Ambientales 
June 2, 2005 (data collection techniques) 
 
1.  Is there a method in existence to evaluate environmental impact? 
Various private consultants and student groups perform environmental 
impact studies.  For example, Surá is in the process of doing an extensive study 
on river contamination throughout the country.  This is not a simple evaluation 
method, but rather a compilation of various extensive analyses of the soil, water, 
and biology of the area in question.  This research involves the help of various 
personnel with extensive backgrounds in environmental engineering, and 
multiple visits to each site in question. 
The Costa Rican government collects information surrounding accidents 
but does not complete an impact statement in its entirety.  It would be very 
difficult for the Bomberos to perform this type of analysis.  Water and soil 
samples are very expensive and take fifteen days to analyze.  The results of this 
analysis must be interpreted together with many other variables, such as the 
speed and turbulence of the water, characteristics of the soil present, weather 
patterns, and wildlife activity, to name only a few.  The analysis utilizes a 
complicated and time-consuming calculation system that cannot be carried out 
without the proper training. 
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2. How can we evaluate the contamination in the air? 
This is very difficult to determine after an accident has occurred because 
the gas has already dissipated.  Analysis of air pollution is generally not done, 
and if so, is qualitative rather than quantitative. 
 
3. How can we evaluate the contamination in the soil? 
Several factors are considered when analyzing soil.  Typically, Surá will 
take several samples from the area of contamination to determine the level of 
toxics that remain in the soil.  There is a specific method to do this.  Engineers 
must take one sample from the point where the spill has occurred.  They must 
also take a control sample, far enough away from the spill that it reflects what the 
soil contained before contamination.  Then, depending on the size and shape of 
the area, they will take a minimum of three more samples to determine the extent 
of the affected area.  On the first trip, those taking the samples will begin by 
taking shallow samples in the area of contamination, carefully noting the 
locations of these samples.  Once these results are analyzed, they will have the 
information they need to know where else samples should be taken.  For 
instance, they may learn from the first samples that they must dig deeper in one 
area to obtain a true depth of contamination.  They may also learn that the 
contamination is spread out into an area that they did not anticipate and that they 
must do additional tests on.  A full analysis can take two or three return trips to 
the same area. 
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4. What is the correct process for sampling the soil? 
A proper sample should be large enough not only to use in multiple tests, 
but also to ensure that it contains an accurate spectrum of the materials at that 
point.  In order to be sure that the sample is large enough, engineers must dig a 
hole that is twenty centimeters wide, twenty centimeters long, and twenty 
centimeters deep.  The soil from this pit must be mixed together thoroughly.  The 
resulting pile must then be placed in a sealed bag and labeled carefully with the 
date, time, location, weather conditions, and any other pertinent observations.  
The sample taker should also label the bag with his or her name and record how 
deep the sample was taken. 
 
5. How can we evaluate the contamination in the water? 
 Water samples are taken in a very similar manner as soil samples.  One 
sample must be taken at the point of the accident and another upstream from the 
spill as a control.  If the samples are being taken from the river, more samples 
should be taken at various distances from the point of contamination, at a 
minimum of three additional samples.  In an area of stagnant water, samples 
should be taken in various places dependant on the shape and size of the body 
of water.  Environmental engineers must first guess where to take water 
samples, and then reevaluate their choices upon receiving results of the sample 
analysis.  For an area of complicated flow pattern, such an inlet, the optimal 
number of samples is closer to ten than to four.   
 
 103
6. What is the correct process for sampling the water? 
 The water must be collected in a large plastic bottle with a screw-on cap.  
The person taking the samples must first rinse out the bottle three times, each 
time filling it completely, shaking it, and then pouring the water back into the area 
of study.  Once the bottle is rinsed, the sample taker then tips it slightly and 
submerges the bottle up to the top, leaving one side of the mouth of the bottle out 
of the water for air to escape.  Rather than fill the bottle all the way to the top, it 
should be filled to a few centimeters below the mouth of the bottle.  The person 
who gathered the sample then carefully labels each bottle with the location and 
date of the sample, his or her own name, and a number to identify the bottle and 
match it with its corresponding information sheet.  The samples are then stored 
at a maximum of four degrees in transport to the laboratory. 
In addition to collecting the actual samples, engineers at Surá also fill out 
an information sheet that corresponds with each bottle.  This sheet includes the 
name of the sample taker, date and time of sample, GPS location, weather 
conditions, and several characteristics of the water itself.  These factors are 
measured on site and filled into the sheet, such as velocity, pH, oxygen level, 
salinity, and temperature of the water.  Investigators can determine the speed of 
the river by placing something buoyant in the water and timing how long it takes 
to travel a certain measured distance. 
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7. How can we measure affects to the local fauna? 
 This is very difficult to do because wild animals will most often run from an 
accident scene and will not appear in the vicinity when investigating engineers 
visit the area.  Only the most obvious deceased or injured animals are available 
for observation or analysis.  However, some animals can be a good indicator of 
contamination.  If one digs into the soil at the scene of an accident, the presence 
of small red worms is a sign of pollution.  Another sign would be if the area of 
suspected contamination appears to be free of wild animals such as birds when 
nearby areas are not the same.  It is possible to take samples of fish from the 
water, but this is a very difficult process. 
 
8. How can we measure affects to the local flora? 
The effects on the plant life in a polluted area appear as discoloration of 
the leaves.  In some areas, plants will be dead altogether.  When studying water 
contamination, the presence of red, brown, or black moss on the rocks may be 
an indicator if the moss is green in other areas of the water.  Much of the damage 
to plant life must be studied in comparison to nearby plant life that has not been 
damaged.  These signs are usually clearly visible and easy to record with 
pictures and descriptions 
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9. What safety measures should we take in order to avoid contamination of 
our samples as well as to protect ourselves? 
 Anyone taking samples in a contaminated area should wear the proper 
safety gear.  They should wear rubber gloves on their hands, boots that will not 
allow contamination to touch their bodies, and face masks where appropriate.  
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APPENDIX H – Interview with Ana Lorena Arias 
Environmental Engineer: Surá, Soluciones Ambientales 
June 22, 2005 (model refinement) 
 
How can we improve the accuracy and depth of our evaluation tool? 
Organic waste should be added as its own category because it can have 
very bad effects on the environment.  This is because it tends to deplete the 
oxygen levels in water.  The level of contamination is as high as that of 
hydrocarbons.  Bunker should be given its own category of very high severity 
because it is worse for the environment than the other effects mentioned. 
The presence of a river will increase the effect of a gas and should 
therefore be considered in our variables.  There should be a range for the basic 
number that indicates whether or not the pollution effects are reversible, and 
whether or not this reversibility can be accomplished with or without human 
intervention.  If the contamination is very low and likely to reverse itself, 
government officials should not bother taking samples.  We should decide at 
what level samples are not necessary and indicate this in our model. 
We should define the different types of animals in our analysis.  For 
instance, we should define domestic, and research which species are protected 
in order for the Bomberos to be able to fill in this information. 
Instead of relying solely on the EPA scale, it may be beneficial to research 
the categorization of chemicals used in some other nations, such as those in 
Europe, for comparison.
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APPENDIX I – Interview with associate of Ana Lorena Arías 
Environmental Engineer: Surá, Soluciones Ambientales 
June 21, 2005 
 
How can we improve the accuracy and depth of our evaluation tool? 
There should be an area to enter weather details at the time of the 
accidents, most importantly, the level of precipitation.  This effects where the 
contamination is carried as well as the speed at which it is absorbed into the soil.  
The wind speed and direction is important to note in order to determine where 
and how far the wind will carry escaped gases.   
 The type of surface is very important because concrete soil, sand, and 
other surfaces have different permeability and filtration characteristics that need 
to be considered.  We should also indicate how far down a river the 
contamination has gone, just as we have indicated areas of soil contamination.  
Forest area should be split up into the two categories of rain forest and 
secondary forest. 
Sewers should be included in the choices for bodies of water since they 
empty directly into the rivers.  In places where there are tides, this movement of 
the water should be considered as it can wash contaminants back into the area 
they are being dispersed from.  Other characteristics of rivers should also be 
considered, such as the inclination of the flow and dilution levels. 
We should also decrease the base numbers, which only describe the type 
of chemical and amount, and raise all of the other factors in our model.  If these 
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numbers are disproportionate, we can be reflecting only the amount of chemical 
released rather than the actual affect it is having on the surrounding area. 
The tool should be described further in a few different ways.  It is apparent 
that this system can only be used within a certain window of time, and there 
should be a description of this limitation included in the instructions so that the 
tool is not used falsely.  In addition, we should create or recommend the creation 
of a similar tool that can be used to study an accident site long after an accident 
has occurred.  A companion human impact assessment would also be very 
helpful, and should include disposal and storage costs, equipment used, as well 
as the number of personnel who were necessary in the emergency response 
effort. 
The final product should be complete with an instruction manual and 
justification for each variable ad its assigned value.  In this way, the tool can 
stand on its own and be used by anyone who has access to the instructions. 
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APPENDIX J – Interview with Alvaro Coto, Environmental Manager,  
                RECOPE – June 17, 2005 
 
1. How many facilities does RECOPE have operating in Costa Rica?  
How much oil does RECOPE process? 
 There are seven facilities in operation in Costa Rica.  A little less than five 
million liters are used each day.  Twenty percent is processed in Limón, the other 
eighty percent is imported from other countries.  Twenty-five percent of the clean 
product is sold for use by automobiles.  The rest is used for airplanes and ships.  
The majority of this fuel is sent to airports in Santa Maria and Garita. 
 
2. How many accidents does RECOPE have every year? 
 Last year there were five accidents, which is an unusually high number, 
two of which were leaks from processing plants and three of which were fuel 
lines broken by road crews.  The leaks occurred in Garita and Cartago.  Possibly 
more leaks in Limón are not on record in the Garita processing plant.   
 
3. What is the biggest accident that RECOPE has had? 
In 2004, there was a leak of fourteen thousand gallons in Heredia.  A road 
repair crew punctured a pipeline with one of the pieces of machinery, causing a 
massive leak.  Some areas of the country are equipped with two-meter high 
signs every fifty feet along the pipelines; however, there are many kilometers of 
pipe that are not marked at all.  RECOPE has drawn maps of all of the pipelines 
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in Costa Rica but road crews do not often use them.  Last year, these maps were 
distributed to the government heads of all of the different provinces in Costa 
Rica.  RECOPE held nine meetings with government officials as well as the Cruz 
Roja, Bomberos, municipalities, Comisión de Emergencias, and local emergency 
commissions from Puntarenas to Limón.  A year later, three out of ten districts 
were using the maps.  The others were not aware that they had the information 
or did not know where it was being stored. 
 
4. Why is it that the road crews do not use the maps? 
It is difficult to explain why road crews do not use the information that they 
have.  There is little cooperation between organizations.  They do as they wish 
without collaborating with other government municipalities.  For MOPT13, this 
means that they do not carry maps of the pipelines with them. 
 
5. In the case of an oil spill, how do you respond? 
Inside the RECOPE facility, there are means to clean up any oil spill that 
occurs.  Anything that may happen outside of the facility is dealt with by the 
Bomberos.  For instance, if there is an accident involving a RECOPE truck 
outside of the facility, RECOPE cannot treat the situation until the Bomberos 
arrive on the scene.  However, all RECOPE trucks carry emergency equipment 
to deal with spills.   
                                                 
13 Ministerio de Obras, Pública, y Transporte – Ministry of Public Works and Transport 
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If an accident occurs inside the facility, RECOPE can treat it until the 
Bomberos arrive and then they must hand over control of the scene immediately.  
RECOPE is equipped to manage any situation that may occur at the facility.  A 
pool of water is stored on site, providing enough to fight a substantial fire in case 
one of the tanks was to ignite.  It is constantly kept circulating by a system of 
hoses and filtered by tilapia fish that eat the contaminants.  In case of a spill at 
the facility, they would fortunately know the identity of the chemical and would be 
able to treat the situation safely.  The personnel at RECOPE would contain the 
spill with a barrier and try to remove some of gasoline with absorbents.  
RECOPE would then clean the soil. 
If a pipeline is leaking, RECOPE must wait for the Bomberos before they 
can respond to the situation.  When this occurs, RECOPE collaborates with the 
Bomberos. 
 
6. Do you use bacteria to clean the soil? 
This method is used, but only within the RECOPE facility.  There is 
currently no information available as to the environmental impact of using such 
bacteria on gasoline or oil spills and an environmental study must be done before 
there is widespread use of this bacteria.  Right now, RECOPE uses bacteria on 
small spills and has to enclose the spill completely before use.  The majority of 
spills are cleaned by pumping away contaminants or absorbing them.  Gasoline 
and kerosene disappear after two months on their own by evaporating.  
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However, diesel has a much bigger impact and takes longer to clean because it 
contains Benzene. 
 
7. What preventative measures do you practice? 
RECOPE can only guard against accidents at their facilities.  Anything that 
occurs outside, such as highway accidents, is the responsibility of MINAE.  All 
RECOPE tanks are equipped with an NFPA 704 label, number of tank, name of 
combustible, DOT flammability label, as well as a UN chemical identity number 
(CASRN).  All RECOPE trucks are labeled with DOT labels and carry emergency 
instructions. 
 
8. Are there laws dictatating the use of labels? 
There are laws in place to use signage on all trucks and tanks, but the 
police do not enforce them.  There are many laws that are not enforced.  There is 
a thousand dollar fine for polluting a river that is rarely paid, if ever.  Eighty 
percent of Costa Ricans think that they do not take adequate care in protecting 
the environment.   
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9. How many people work in Environmental Engineering for 
RECOPE? 
There are six people working in environmental studies for RECOPE 
currently.  They work in the areas of biology, forestry, geology, environmental 
impact and environmental education. 
 
10.  What should be considered when studying the severity of 
environmental impacts? 
Soil water and vegetation damage should be studied primarily.  
Researchers should look for the presence of heavy metals, benzene, toluene, 
and hydrocarbons in samples.  Water should be considered as a medium for the 
spread of contamination.  This includes water in the soil, underground, and 
flowing above ground.  Ecosystem damage should be looked at, including 
species populations and their effect on the food chain.  Rivers will clean 
themselves quicker the faster they are flowing because flowing water helps to 
emulsify chemicals.  The banks of the river, however, remain contaminated for 
longer. 
RECOPE’s priority is in people first, then the environmental, then their 
own facilities.   
When looking at the animal population in the area, consider that most 
animals will move away from an accident site.  However, in Costa Rica and other 
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tropical climates, replenishment of species and soil quality is faster than in other 
climates.   
 
11.  How long does the natural cleanup process take? 
If gasoline spills into the soil, it will be gone within two months with 
treatment.  Without treatment, it will take three months.  After forty five days, 
ninety percent of the fuel in soil will be destroyed if it is close to the surface.  With 
no treatment effort, it can sink deeper underground and be there for centuries.  A 
chemical like benzene will last even longer, perhaps for thousands of years.   
 
12.  How much does it cost to clean a contaminated area? 
The cost to clean a gasoline spill is eight million dollars per acre in the 
United States, and fourteen million dollars per hectare in Costa Rica. 
 
13.  Where does RECOPE get its information regarding the 
environmental impact of chemical spills and cleanup procedures? 
RECOPE receives training from PetroCanada as well as ChevronTexaco.  
They receive funding from Miami as members of Clean Caribbean.  MINAE has 
its own classification system for chemicals. 
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14.  How can we improve our own impact system? 
Consider the ocean in the water contamination portion of the analysis.  
Also, be sure to remember that all sewers lead into the rivers and then the sea 
and so need to be considered.  There should be a distinction between 
endangered and protected species, and this will need to be researched for the 
Bomberos.  You should also distinguish between domestic and wild animals. 
Bunker is very toxic and should be classified among the worst chemicals.  
Diesel should be categorized separately than gasoline because gasoline will 
evaporate quickly.  We should also consider the depth of soil contamination and 
dilution levels in the water. 
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APPENDIX K – TRANSIT POLICE INTERVIEW 
                June 23, 2005 
 
 Data collected from the police was difficult to come by.  Unlike the 
Bomberos, who have a large office building with computers for all of the 
employees, the transit police were clearly much shorter on funds.  The police 
were headquartered in a small office building and were limited with technology 
such as computers.  
 Some of the questions we asked included the number of traffic tickets 
given out in any time span, number of accidents reported to the police, and the 
amount of revenue received by giving out speeding tickets and other driving 
infractions.  The police had no statistics to offer us for any of these questions.  
We asked if anyone would know this type of information, and the police 
suggested that the people at social security might have the statistics we were 
looking for but were not sure. 
 Instead of giving us the statistics we desired, the police gave us some very 
basic information including the cost of speeding ticket and other laws that pertain 
to hazardous materials.  A speeding ticket is five thousand colones at the base 
level, and going twenty kilometers per hour over the speed limit results in a 
twenty thousand colones fine.  There are certain roads, such as the highway 
between the SJO international airport and downtown San José that trucks 
carrying hazardous materials are not allowed to travel on from the times of 7:00-
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8:15 am and 4:00-6:30 pm.  In addition, failure for paying traffic fines results in a 
thirty percent yearly interest rate. 
 The few laws and regulations that we heard about were encouraging 
information for us to hear, but the interview moved on to how these and other 
traffic laws are not strictly enforced.  In Costa Rica, the police cannot collect 
traffic fines because too many citizens chose to not voluntary pay.  Also, signage 
regulations are sometimes not closely followed by truckers, and will mislabel their 
vehicles either on purpose or for lack of care.  We received no data showing how 
serious these issues really were, but the police gave the impression that they are 
commonplace.  
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APPENDIX L – Nosara Accident Report 
Interview with Nicoya Bombero, Roy Herrera – June 8, 2005 
 
1. What was the cause of the accident?  
A farmer was trying to deparasite his cows and bought a container of Metafox 
(Remason 1211) to do this.  He used five gallons on his cows before realizing 
that they were dying from the chemical.  There are several ways this could 
have happened.  Perhaps the Metafox mixed with another chemical in the 
area and reacted.  Perhaps the dosage used by the farmer was too high.  The 
chemical could also have been expired. 
 
2. How did you learn of the accident?  How long did it take for you to 
respond? 
The incident occurred at 3:00 pm but they did not learn of it until they received 
a call at 5:00 pm.  Two and a half hours later they arrived on the scene. 
 
3. How did you learn what chemical was involved?  How much time did 
this take? 
Upon arrival at the farm, the farmer was able to tell them what substance he 
had been using and what had transpired. 
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4. How did you warn the public?  How did you keep people from 
entering the affected area? 
The police closed off the affected zone and evacuated the area.  Forty people 
were evacuated for ten hours.  One person was taken to the hospital. 
 
5. What was the area of the affected zone? 
The area was approximately forty square meters. 
 
6. Are there wells in the area or sources of food such as farms? 
There are wells in the area but they are not currently in use. 
 
7. How did you clean the area?  How much did this cost? 
In this case, teh fire department did not do anything to clean the area.  The 
chemical was left to soak into the ground. 
 
8. Whose fault was this accident? 
The farmers who had applied the chemical was Sr. Emerito Araya and one 
other person who worked on Sr. Araya’s farm. 
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9. How many people were affected and in what way?  Were there any 
injuries to Bomberos? 
There was one person affected.  The person who had applied the chemical 
with Sr. Araya was sent to the hospital in serious condition.  No bomberos 
were injured or affected in any way.  However there was a strong chemical 
smell at the accident scene and it was difficult to breathe. 
 
10. How did the cows die in this instance? 
The farmers were not aware that they were poisoning the cows until they 
were almost done applying the material, at which time the cows began to drop 
to the ground.  They then called the fire department.  All of the cows were put 
in one pile in the field and left there. 
 
11.  How much would it cost to replace the cows? 
The cost of replacing all of the cows was approximately five million colones; 
₡300,000 per cow and ₡ 1,000,000 per bull. 
 
12.  How many farms were affected? 
No other farms were affected. 
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Interview with Sr. Emerito Araya – June 9, 2005 
 Sr. Araya bought the chemical in Nicoya from a veterinarian.  This 
individual explained to him how to apply the chemical and how much to use.  Sr. 
Araya and his son prepared the compound and painted it onto the backs of all of 
the cows.  A few moments after application, the cows began head butting each 
other and dropping to the ground.  Sr. Araya claimed that twenty-six cows died 
and their bodies had been put into two long pits, four meters deep and twenty 
meters wide, burned and then buried.  He also claims that this product was used 
at another farm and killed forty-eight bulls.  As it turns out, the chemical was 
actually an herbicide but was sold to him for application on his cows anyway.  His 
son was hospitalized with severe respiratory problems and a loss of sphincter 
control.  The son was put on a glucose drip for eight days. 
 There were soil samples taken by one of the ministries but Sr. Araya did 
not know what had been done with them.  He asked that people be alerted about 
this chemical because nothing had been done to help him after his loss. 
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Interview with Nosara Police, Guanacaste – June 9, 2005 
 
 The police were the first to be on the scene, followed by the Ministerio de 
Salud and, lastly, the Bomberos.  They reported a strong chemical smell in the 
area.  The soil where the cows had been painted with the chemical was blue and 
green.  Soil samples were taken by the Ministerio de Salud and analyzed, 
however the police were not informed of the results.  There were no effects on 
the plants. 
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Interview with Ministerio de Salud – June 10, 2005 
 
A representative from Ministerio de Salud refuted some of the facts that 
Sr. Araya had given to us.  There is no report of any other incidents involving this 
chemical.  Furthermore, only twenty-two cows were killed by the incident, as 
opposed to twenty-six.  Ministerio de Salud determined that even though the 
bottle was clearly labeled, Sr. Araya and his son had made a mistake in their 
application because neither of them were literate.  They could have bought the 
chemical more than a year prior to using it on the cows, surpassing the expiration 
date and increasing its toxicity. 
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 APPENDIX M – LA ESE 
Interview with Pérez Zeledón Bomberos – June 14, 2005 
 
1. What was the cause of the accident?  
A tanker truck overturned on the highway.  The driver had been speeding for 
a long time.  As a result the brakes on the truck had become very hot and 
malfunctioned, causing the driver to lose control. 
 
2. How did you learn of the accident?  How long did it take for you to 
respond? 
Someone called 911 and the fire fighters were there within fifteen minutes. 
 
3. How did you learn what chemical was involved?  How much time did 
this take? 
The truck was carrying the appropriate labels and the driver was able to tell 
the fire department what he had been transporting.   
 
4. How did you warn the public?  How did you keep people from 
entering the affected area? 
The police and fire department closed the highway and evacuated two nearby 
families.   
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5. What was the area of the affected zone? 
All of the contents of the truck washed directly into a nearby ditch and so the 
affected area was very small.  However, a stream developed later on in the 
same ditch, washing gasoline into nearby rivers and eventually to the ocean. 
 
6. Are there wells in the area or sources of food such as farms? 
There are no wells in the area but, much of the gasoline washed into nearby 
streams.  These streams are only used for recreational use however. 
 
7. How did you clean the area?  How much did this cost? 
The spill was contained with dikes and absorbed with soil and foam but they 
could not stop the contaminants from washing downstream. 
 
8. Whose fault was this accident? 
The driver had been speeding and therefore, was at fault in this case. 
 
9. How many people were affected and in what way?  Were there any 
injuries to Bomberos? 
There were no people who were directly affected by this incident, but there 
was a large ecological affect. 
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10. How much was the lost gasoline worth? 
The gasoline was worth ₡ 8,000,000 
 
11. If you could do something different to improve this situation, what 
would it have been?  Is there some equipment that you would have 
liked to have had? 
It would be beneicial to have a hazardous materials unit available in the area 
but there aren’t enough resources to do this. 
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Interview with the Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados (A y A) 
– June 15, 2005 
 
1. How many people were affected by this accident? 
The spill occurred downstream from one water treatment facility and so that 
facility was not affected at all.  The water treatment facility downstream was 
closed off and as a result, no people could drink contaminated water form this 
facility. 
 
2. How did the water treatment plant respond to the spill? 
The facility asked the San José office of RECOPE, the oil company involved, 
to remove the contaminated soil in the area of the stream, but they refused de 
to the high cost.  A soil sample was taken and sent to the A y A office in San 
José.  Nothing further was done to respond to this spill. 
 
3. How do the local people know not to drink the water in such an 
incident? 
The spill is reported to the local government heads and then passed along to 
the citizens of the different areas by word of mouth. 
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4. How many people does the San Isidro water treatment facility supply 
with potable water? 
There are approximately 100,000 people supplied with the water, which 
comes from the San Isidro treatment plant. 
 
5. How many times does an accident of this type occur? 
This type of accident is very rare.  This was the first one that had occurred in 
the area in a number of years. 
 
6. How is the water treated? 
Water is allowed to enter large tanks at the facility where solids can settle to 
the bottom of the river.  After this, the water is treated with chlorine and sent 
out into the acueducts.  This chlorine is produced in Nicaragua.  In the case of 
a gasoline spill, the company responsible must provide active carbon filters.  
There is twenty-four hour testing done on the water every day at the plant in 
order to monitor for contaminants. 
 
7. What is the water in the rivers used for? 
Water in the rivers is used for farming, fishing, drinking, and recreation. 
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8. Are there highways that run close to the water treatment facilities?  
What would you do if there were a spill directly into the water 
treatment facility? 
The main highway runs directly by the A y A facility, however there is no plan 
in place for direct contamination of the rivers.  There is a research project in 
progress to determine a better warning system for people who are using 
water that has become contaminated.  There is always a certain level of 
contaminants that enters the water as runoff from the highways.   
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APPENDIX N – SAN ISIDRO 
Interview with Pérez Zeledón Bomberos – 14, 2005 
 
1. What was the cause of the accident?  
A tanker truck overturned on the highway.  The driver had been driving for 
almost two straight days and fallen asleep at the wheel of the vehicle, which 
subsequently veered out of control and off the highway. 
 
2. How did you learn of the accident?  How long did it take for you to 
respond? 
The Cruz Roja called the Bomberos and they responded to the scene within 
twenty minutes. 
 
3. How did you learn what chemical was involved?  How much time did 
this take? 
The truck was carrying the appropriate labels that indicated that the contents 
were flamable.   
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4. How did you warn the public?  How did you keep people from 
entering the affected area? 
There was no evacuation necessary because all of the contaminants had 
spilled into a nearby river.  The area was closed off to the public and treated 
by the fire department. 
 
5. What was the area of the affected zone? 
The entire river was affected by the spill. 
 
6. How did you clean the area?  How much did this cost? 
Nothing was done to clean the area by the fire department because there was 
already a natural dike at the point in the river where the spill took place and 
the presence of rain made it impossible to absorb the spill. 
 
7. Whose fault was this accident? 
The driver who had been sleeping was at fault.  Unfortunately, he was injured 
in the accident and hosptalized. 
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1. How many people were affected and in what way?  Were there any 
injuries to Bomberos? 
There were no people who were directly affected by this incident, but there 
was a large ecological affect. 
 
2. How much was the lost gasoline worth? 
The gasoline was worth ₡ 6,000,000 in total.  This breaks down to ₡ 394 per 
liter for gasoline and ₡ 286 per liter for diesel. 
 141

  142
 143
 144
 145
APPENDIX O – TOTAL GAS STATION, SAN JOSÉ 
Interview with Tibás Bomberos – June 16, 2005 
 
1. What was the cause of the accident?  
An underground tank was leaking gasoline into the soil and streams 
surrounding the Total gas station.  A suspected twenty thousand liters of 
gasoline was leaking.  The tank is still underground. 
 
2. How did you learn of the accident? 
There were calls reporting a very strong smell of gasoline in the area of the 
gas station.  The Bomberos responded, looking for a leak of combustibles so 
as to prevent an explosion.  They found from tests done on the water in a 
stream that runs by the gas station that the ground had become very 
contaminated with gasoline and determined that there was an underground 
leak.  This was done by coordinating with the National Commission of 
Emergencies. 
 
3. How did you learn what chemical was involved?  How much time did 
this take? 
The details of this accident are still not complete.  The leak could either be 
coming from one of two tanks or from the pipes that run between the tanks.  
The water nearby has been tested but was contaminated to bein with. 
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4. How did you warn the public?  How did you keep people from 
entering the affected area? 
There were thirty-five people evacuated from the area and taken to a shelter 
that is designated for this type of an emergency.  They were given food and a 
place to sleep. 
 
5. What was the area of the affected zone? 
The affected area had a radius of about fifty meters. 
 
6. Are there wells in the area or sources of food such as farms? 
There are no wells in the area but much of the gasoline washed into nearby 
streams.  There are three streams near the Total station that may have been 
affected. 
 
7. How did you clean the area?  How much did this cost? 
The spill was contained with dikes and absorbed with soil and foam but they 
could not stop the contaminants from washing downstream.  The soil should 
be rmoved but the scene is currently under control of the owner. 
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8. Whose fault was this accident? 
The Total gas station is at fault in this case, but it was recently owned by 
another company.  They should ideally be responsible for paying for the 
cleanup and evacuation of the area but have not yet been taken in front of the 
environmental tribunal. 
 
9. How many people were affected and in what way?  Were there any 
injuries to Bomberos? 
Two people were treated for severe headaches at the hospital. 
 
10. How much was the lost gasoline worth? 
It is not yet clear how large this leak was. 
 
11. If you could do something different to improve this situation, what 
would it have been?  Is there some equipment that you would have 
liked to have had? 
It would be very beneficial to have more advanced warning of ongoing 
chemical leaks such as this one.  The public should know to call the fire 
department in case of such an accident.  
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Interview with Ministerio de Salud – June 17, 2005 
  The details of this accident are not completely known.  The gasoline 
was leaking into the stream in two places.  This lead the Ministerio de Salud 
to believe that there may be two tanks leaking chemicals into the ground.  
One tank is likely to be an actual fuel tank, and the other a septic tank that 
holds all of the toxic runoff from the station’s drainage system.  There could 
also be a leak in a pipe rather than a tank. 
  This gasoline station has been suspended from running since 2004 
because it had failed to pass inspection.  The underground tanks had failed to 
pass required tests such as pressure and hydrostatic tests, but the station 
had been operating without a license anyway.  This station had been 
operating this way for two years prior as a Shell station.  This was allowed to 
happen because the ministries do not have enough time to check on expired 
licenses.  Often, there is no follow-up on such cases and the responsible 
companies ever have to pay for the damages or cost of cleanup.  This station 
has caused additional problems, as the oil from the cars enters the stream 
each time the water table is high.  The people in this area do not drink the 
water form the streams but will be affected if there is ay exposure to their 
skin.   
  Overall, there is not enough communication between organizations 
or follow-up on the prosecution of polluters.  All of the ministries would benefit 
 149
from sharing information, and this would make it easier to hold guilty parties 
accountable for their actions. 
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APPENDIX P – MAP OF COSTA RICA ACCIDENT SITES 
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APPENDIX Q – INS/OCO Raw Data about Accidents 
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APPENDIX R – SAMPLE OF EPA REPORTALE QUANTITY SCALE 
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TABLE 302.4—LIST OF HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES AND REPORTABLE QUANTITIES 
[Note: All Comments/Notes Are Located at the End of This Table] 
Hazardous substance CASRN Regulatory synonyms 
Statutory Final RQ 
RQ Code † 
RCRA 
waste 
Number 
Cat­
egory Pounds (Kg) 
Acenaphthene ............................................................................................ 83329 ............................................................................. 1* 2 B 100 (45.4) 
Acenaphthylene ......................................................................................... 208968 ............................................................................. 1* 2 D 5000 (2270) 
Acetaldehyde ............................................................................................. 75070 Ethanal ............................................................... 1000 1,3,4 U001 C 1000 (454) 
Acetaldehyde, chloro­ ................................................................................ 107200 Chloroacetaldehyde ........................................... 1* 4 P023 C 1000 (454) 
Acetaldehyde, trichloro­ ............................................................................. 75876 Chloral ................................................................ 1* 4 U034 D 5000 (2270) 
Acetamide .................................................................................................. 60355 ............................................................................. 1* 3 B 100 (45.4) 
Acetamide, N-(aminothioxomethyl)- ........................................................... 591082 1-Acetyl-2-thiourea ............................................. 1* 4 P002 C 1000 (454) 
Acetamide, N-(4-ethoxyphenyl)­ ................................................................ 62442 Phenacetin ......................................................... 1* 4 U187 B 100 (45.4) 
Acetamide, 2-fluoro- ................................................................................... 640197 Fluoroacetamide ................................................. 1* 4 P057 B 100 (45.4) 
Acetamide, N-9H-fluoren-2-yl- ................................................................... 53963 2-Acetylaminofluorene ........................................ 1* 3,4 U005 X 1 (0.454) 
Acetic acid .................................................................................................. 64197 ............................................................................. 1000 1 D 5000 (2270) 
Acetic acid (2,4-dichlorophenoxy)-, salts & esters .................................... 94757 2,4-D Acid, ......................................................... 
2,4-D,salts and esters 
100 1,3,4 U240 B 100 (45.4) 
Acetic acid, Lead(2+) salt .......................................................................... 301042 Lead acetate ...................................................... 5000 1,4 U144 A 10 (4.54) 
Acetic acid, thallium (1+) salt ..................................................................... 563688 Thallium(I) acetate ............................................. 1* 4 U214 B 100 (45.4) 
Acetic acid, (2,4,5-trichlorophenoxy) ......................................................... 93765 2,4,5-T ................................................................ 
2,4,5-T acid 
100 1,4 U232 C 1000 (454) 
Acetic acid, ethyl ester ............................................................................... 141786 Ethyl acetate ...................................................... 1* 4 U112 D 5000 (2270) 
Acetic acid, fluoro-, sodium salt ................................................................. 62748 Fluoroacetic acid, sodium salt ........................... 1* 4 P058 A 10 (4.54) 
Acetic anhydride ........................................................................................ 108247 ............................................................................. 1000 1 D 5000 (2270) 
Acetone ...................................................................................................... 67641 2-Propanone ....................................................... 1* 4 U002 D 5000 (2270) 
Acetone cyanohydrin ................................................................................. 75865 Propanenitrile, 2-hydroxy-2-methyl-2-
Methyllactonitrile. 
10 1,4 P069 A 10 (4.54) 
Acetonitrile ................................................................................................. 75058 ............................................................................. 1* 3,4 U003 D 5000 (2270) 
Acetophenone ............................................................................................ 98862 Ethanone, 1-phenyl- ........................................... 1* 3,4 U004 D 5000 (2270) 
2-Acetylaminofluorene ............................................................................... 53963 Acetamide, N-9H-fluoren-2-yl- ........................... 1* 3,4 U005 X 1 (0.454) 
Acetyl bromide ........................................................................................... 506967 ............................................................................. 5000 1 D 5000 (2270) 
Acetyl chloride ............................................................................................ 75365 ............................................................................. 5000 1,4 U006 D 5000 (2270) 
1-Acetyl-2-thiourea ..................................................................................... 591082 Acetamide, N-(aminothioxomethyl)- ................... 1* 4 P002 C 1000 (454) 
Acrolein ...................................................................................................... 107028 2-Propenal .......................................................... 1 1,2,3,4 P003 X 1 (0.454) 
Acrylamide ................................................................................................. 79061 2-Propenamide ................................................... 1* 3,4 U007 D 5000 (2270) 
Acrylic acid ................................................................................................. 79107 2-Propenoic acid ................................................ 1* 3,4 U008 D 5000 (2270) 
Acrylonitrile ................................................................................................. 107131 2-Propenenitrile .................................................. 100 1,2,3,4 U009 B 100 (45.4) 
Adipic acid .................................................................................................. 124049 ............................................................................. 5000 1 D 5000 (2270) 
Aldicarb ...................................................................................................... 116063 Propanal, -methyl-2-(methylthio)-,O­
[(methylamino)carbonyl]oxime. 
1* 4 P070 X 1 (0.454) 
Aldrin .......................................................................................................... 309002 1,4,5,8-Dimethanonaphthalene, 
10-hexachloro-1,4,4a,5,8,8a-hexahydro-, 
(1alpha, 
4alpha,4abeta,5alpha,8alpha,8abeta)-. 
1 1,2,4 P004 X 1 (0.454) 
................................................................................................ 107186 ..................................................... 100 P005 B 
2
1,2,3,4,10,10-
40 C
FR C
h. I (7–1–01 Ed
itio
n) Allyl alcohol 2-Propen-1-ol 1,4 100 (45.4) 
Enviro
nm
e
nta
l Pro
te
c
tio
n A
g
e
nc
y 
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Allyl chloride ............................................................................................... 107051 ............................................................................. 1000 1,3 C 1000 (454) 
Aluminum phosphide ................................................................................. 20859738 ............................................................................. 1* 4 P006 B 100 (45.4) 
Aluminum sulfate ....................................................................................... 10043013 ............................................................................. 5000 1 D 5000 (2270) 
4-Aminobiphenyl ........................................................................................ 92671 ............................................................................. 1* 3 X 1 (0.454) 
5-(Aminomethyl)-3-isoxazolol ..................................................................... 2763964 Muscimol 3(2H)-Isoxazolone, 5-(aminomethyl)- 1* 4 P007 C 1000 (454) 
4-Aminopyridine ......................................................................................... 504245 4-Pyridinamine ................................................... 1* 4 P008 C 1000 (454) 
Amitrole ...................................................................................................... 61825 1H-1,2,4-Triazol-3-amine ................................... 1* 4 U011 A 10 (4.54) 
Ammonia .................................................................................................... 7664417 ............................................................................. 100 1 B 100 (45.4) 
Ammonium acetate .................................................................................... 631618 ............................................................................. 5000 1 D 5000 (2270) 
Ammonium benzoate ................................................................................. 1863634 ............................................................................. 5000 1 D 5000 (2270) 
Ammonium bicarbonate ............................................................................. 1066337 ............................................................................. 5000 1 D 5000 (2270) 
Ammonium bichromate .............................................................................. 7789095 ............................................................................. 1000 1 A 10 (4.54) 
Ammonium bifluoride ................................................................................. 1341497 ............................................................................. 5000 1 B 100 (45.4) 
Ammonium bisulfite .................................................................................... 10192300 ............................................................................. 5000 1 D 5000 (2270) 
Ammonium carbamate ............................................................................... 1111780 ............................................................................. 5000 1 D 5000 (2270) 
Ammonium carbonate ................................................................................ 506876 ............................................................................. 5000 1 D 5000 (2270) 
Ammonium chloride ................................................................................... 12125029 ............................................................................. 5000 1 D 5000 (2270) 
Ammonium chromate ................................................................................. 7788989 ............................................................................. 1000 1 A 10 (4.54) 
Ammonium citrate, dibasic ......................................................................... 3012655 ............................................................................. 5000 1 D 5000 (2270) 
Ammonium fluoborate ................................................................................ 13826830 ............................................................................. 5000 1 D 5000 (2270) 
Ammonium fluoride .................................................................................... 12125018 ............................................................................. 5000 1 B 100 (45.4) 
Ammonium hydroxide ................................................................................ 1336216 ............................................................................. 1000 1 C 1000 (454) 
Ammonium oxalate .................................................................................... 6009707 ............................................................................. 5000 1 D 5000 (2270) 
5972736 
14258492 
Ammonium picrate ..................................................................................... 131748 Phenol, 2,4,6-trinitro-, ammonium salt ............... 1* 4 P009 A 10 (4.54) 
Ammonium silicofluoride ............................................................................ 16919190 ............................................................................. 1000 1 C 1000 (454) 
Ammonium sulfamate ................................................................................ 7773060 ............................................................................. 5000 1 D 5000 (2270) 
Ammonium sulfide ..................................................................................... 12135761 ............................................................................. 5000 1 B 100 (45.4) 
Ammonium sulfite ...................................................................................... 10196040 ............................................................................. 5000 1 D 5000 (2270) 
Ammonium tartrate .................................................................................... 14307438 ............................................................................. 5000 1 D 5000 (2270) 
3164292 
Ammonium thiocyanate ............................................................................. 1762954 ............................................................................. 5000 1 D 5000 (2270) 
Ammonium vanadate ................................................................................. 7803556 Vanadic acid, ammonium salt ............................ 1* 4 P119 C 1000 (454) 
Amyl acetate .............................................................................................. 628637 ............................................................................. 1000 1 D 5000 (2270) 
iso-Amyl acetate ..................................................................................... 123922 
sec-Amyl acetate .................................................................................... 626380 
tert-Amyl acetate .................................................................................... 625161 
Aniline ........................................................................................................ 62533 Benzenamine ..................................................... 1000 1,3,4 U012 D 5000 (2270) 
o-Anisidine ................................................................................................. 90040 ............................................................................. 1* 3 B 100 (45.4) 
Anthracene ................................................................................................. 120127 ............................................................................. 1* 2 D 5000 (2270) 
Antimony ‡ .................................................................................................. 7440360 ............................................................................. 1* 2 D 5000 (2270) 
ANTIMONY AND COMPOUNDS .............................................................. N.A. Antimony Compounds ........................................ 1* 2,3 ** 
Antimony Compounds ................................................................................ N.A. ANTIMONY AND COMPOUNDS ....................... 1* 2,3 ** 
Antimony pentachloride ............................................................................. 7647189 ............................................................................. 1000 1 C 1000 (454) 
Antimony potassium tartrate ...................................................................... 28300745 ............................................................................. 1000 1 B 100 (45.4) 
Antimony tribromide ................................................................................... 7789619 ............................................................................. 1000 1 C 1000 (454) 
Antimony trichloride ................................................................................... 10025919 ............................................................................. 1000 1 C 1000 (454) 
Antimony trifluoride .................................................................................... 7783564 ............................................................................. 1000 1 C 1000 (454) 
Antimony trioxide ....................................................................................... 1309644 ............................................................................. 5000 1 C 1000 (454) 
§
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